Pace Law Review
Volume 42

Issue 2

Article 5

August 2022

A Rhetoric of Sustainable Development
Jeff Todd
jat169@txstate.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeff Todd, A Rhetoric of Sustainable Development, 42 Pace L. Rev. 417 (2022)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol42/iss2/5
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

A RHETORIC OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Jeff Todd*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 417
II. FROM FALSE IDENTIFICATIONS TO TROPOLOGICAL CORRECTIVES: A
SURVEY OF BURKE’S RHETORIC ................................................................ 422
A. Identification, Terministic Screens, and the Rhetoric
of Substance ..................................................................................... 422
B. Efficiency, Casuistry, and the Mixed Dead Metaphors
of Law.................................................................................................. 428
C. The Four Master Tropes: Devices for Perspective by
Incongruity ....................................................................................... 433
III. A RHETORICAL CRITIQUE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
TERMINOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION AND MATERIAL DIVISION ........... 437
A. Uneven Development, Fragmented Laws, and a
Rhetorical Solution ........................................................................ 438
B. Sustainable Development as a Terministic Screen:
The Dubious Identification of Agreeing “in Principle”.... 442
C. The Three Pillars and Triple Bottom Line as Mixed
Dead Metaphors.............................................................................. 448
IV. A RHETORICAL CORRECTIVE: ADDITIONAL TROPES FOR NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ................................. 454
V. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 460
I.

INTRODUCTION

Sustainable development is a “big tent” concept that allows
various stakeholders to find common ground.1 Laws and companies
that balance the three pillars or the triple bottom line (the factors
related to economy, environment, and equity) can promote
Associate Professor of Business Law, Texas State University. I would like to thank
the editors of the PACE LAW REVIEW, in particular for taking on the challenge of this
interdisciplinary article.
1. Alison Peck, Sustainable Development and the Reconciliation of Opposites, 57
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 151, 158 (2012) (writing that the ambiguity of the term sustainable
development creates a “‘big tent,’ spacious enough to accommodate three usually
disparate factions—development proponents, environmental groups, and social
justice advocates”); see Albert C. Lin, Myths of Environmental Law, 2015 UTAH L. REV.
45, 65 (2015) (explaining how “sustainable development offers to reconcile the
interests of present and future generations and of the rich and poor . . . .”).
*
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development that meets the needs of present and future generations.2
Critics have nevertheless attacked this seeming strength as a
discursive weakness.3 While the concept enables numerous,
sometimes divergent, interests to find general agreement, it
simultaneously makes it harder for them to articulate priorities and
thus implement meaningful legal and policy changes.4
Though they draw attention to the discursive shortcomings of
sustainable development, commentators in the main have not applied
rhetorical theory or literary criticism.5 Those who do, however, hint
2. See, e.g., U.N. World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev., Report of the World Commission
on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, U.N. Doc. A/42/427, at 54
(1987), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/139811?ln=en [hereinafter BRUNDTLAND
REPORT] (“Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs.”); PETER JACQUES, SUSTAINABILITY: THE BASICS 116 (2015) (calling the “Triple
Bottom Line” of sustainability “a way of operating multi-criteria accounting” to
balance the trade-offs of economic growth, environmental values, and social justice);
Gerlinde Berger-Walliser & Paul Shrivastava, Beyond Compliance: Sustainable
Development, Business, and Proactive Law, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 417, 425 (2015) (“The
Brundtland Report synthesizes sustainability in terms of the ‘Three E’s’: environment,
economy, and equity.”).
3. See, e.g., Scott D. Campbell & Moira Zellner, Wicked Problems, Foolish
Decisions: Promoting Sustainability Through Urban Governance in a Complex World, 73
VAND.
L.
REV.
1643,
1657
(2020)
(“Although
many
have
envisioned sustainable development as a win-win outcome to enable continued
growth without environmental costs, the model’s focus on reconciling three conflicts
suggested a more realistic view of the inevitability of trade-offs in a finite world.”);
Scott Fulton, David Clarke & María Amparo Albán, Environmental Sustainability:
Finding a Working Definition, 47 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10488, 10488 (2017)
(“[D]espite its expanding presence in environmental policy discourse since [1987],
sustainability still suffers from ambiguity that must be overcome if governmental and
private-sector decisionmakers are to optimize the concept’s potential.”); Becky L.
Jacobs & Brad Finney, Defining Sustainable Business—Beyond Greenwashing, 37 VA.
ENV’T L.J. 89, 90–91 (2019) (calling the lack of “a precise, authoritative definition” for
sustainability a “threat . . . to a generally positive and important trend”).
4. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Myth of the Win-Win: Misdiagnosis in the
Business of Reassembling Nature, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 297, 297 (2000) (attacking “the
conviction that gains from economic development could be enjoyed without sacrifice
of the natural world” as “a convenient, powerful, and serviceable myth [that] . . .
happens to be faulty at its foundations.”); Jorge E. Viñuales, The Rise and Fall of
Sustainable Development, 22 REV. EUR. CMTY. & INT’L ENV’T L. 3, 6 (2013) (calling the
“ability to encompass very different issues without clarifying the relations among
them” a weakness of sustainable development because “it is indeed very difficult to
set priorities”).
5. Many scholars have employed some variation of rhetoric in the base sense of
empty verbiage. See, e.g., Sanford E. Gaines, Reimagining Environmental Law for the
21st Century, 44 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10188, 10198 (2014) (“The question for
this part is why new norms for sustainability have not yet emerged to
transform sustainable development rhetoric into behavioral reality.”); id. at 10211
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at the insight to be gained from such approaches. For example,
sustainable development has numerous discourses depending upon
the community (whether business or government, for example),6
which leads to practical problems like “materiality” being defined
differently in financial versus environmental, social, and governance
(ESG) reporting.7 One analysis of the “discourses, debates and
rhetoric about sustainable development” found “that the concept
occupies highly contested ground,” so the path toward
implementation is not consensus but the disruption of “settled
assumptions.”8 Another explains how sustainable development
functions as a myth by reinforcing a shared recognition of the core
truth about the earth’s limited carrying capacity, but this myth also
veils genuine disagreement and the shortcomings of proposed
solutions.9 One article that explored alternative narratives to “lift the
veil” on sustainable development therefore urged more
interdisciplinary research that draws on the humanities, in particular
rhetoric,10 which is not merely ornamental but is instead a means
toward better understanding and ultimately to action.11
(“The world does not need new ideas or new principles; the difficult work is to bring
the existing ideas and principles down from the realms of rhetorical declarations
adopted by international conferences to the level of ordinary citizens, to embed those
norms into the choices people make every day in their work and their personal
lives.”). Although this use of “rhetoric” differs from this Article’s employing rhetoric
as a critical theory with a robust contemporary following, the underlying point about
the disjunction between the lofty language of sustainable development and the failure
of implementation is well-founded. See infra Part III.
6. See Nancy D. Perkins, The Dialects and Dimensions of Sustainability, 21 J. ENV’T
& SUSTAINABILITY L. 331, 338 (2015).
7. Ruth Jebe, The Convergence of Financial and ESG Materiality: Taking
Sustainability Mainstream, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 645, 646 (2019) (“Disagreement over the
definition of materiality has resulted in financial and ESG disclosure occupying
separate domains, a result that hampers mainstreaming of sustainability by keeping
ESG factors separate from business operations.”).
8. Jaye Ellis, Sustainable Development and Fragmentation in International
Society, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 57, 66, 72 (Duncan French ed.,
2010).
9. See Lin, supra note 1, at 90.
10. Christopher P. Guzelian & Jeff Todd, Sustainable Money, 94 TEMPLE L. REV.
453, 458.
11. E.g., ANNE MARIE TODD, COMMUNICATING ENVIRONMENTAL PATRIOTISM: A
RHETORICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 5 (2013) (“Thinking
rhetorically about environmental issues means thinking pragmatically about how to
educate and mobilize action on the environment as well as thinking constitutively:
acknowledging that representations of nature and environmental problems shape
our understanding of our world and ourselves.”); Michael Burger, Environmental
Law/Environmental Literature, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 5 (2013) (writing that a method like
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Kenneth Burke, who is arguably the most influential rhetorician
since the classical era,12 has a body of work that spans half a century.13
From this corpus emerge theories that are particularly apt for an
exploration of sustainable development: he examines business and
economics throughout his works,14 he has been dubbed the “pioneer
of ecocriticism,”15 and he is a “critical theorist of social change.”16
Accordingly, this Article applies Burkean rhetoric, first to explain how
literary criticism “offers a way to uncover how we identify and define problems (and
problem-makers), how we conceive desirable goals (and goal-achievers) and how we
craft solutions”).
12. See Anthony Burke et al., Editor’s Introduction to KENNETH BURKE, THE WAR OF
WORDS 1, 1 (Anthony Burke, Kyle Jensen & Jack Selzer eds., 2018) (characterizing
Burke’s A Rhetoric of Motives as “the most intriguing, original, and stimulating
contribution to rhetorical theory since Aristotle’s treatise on the subject”); Richard
Graff & Wendy Winn, Kenneth Burke’s “Identification” and Chaïm Perelman and Lucie
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s “Communion”: A Case of Convergent Evolution?, in THE PROMISE OF
REASON: STUDIES IN THE NEW RHETORIC 103, 103 (John T. Gage ed., 2011) (calling Burke
and Chaïm Perelman “the head of the canon of twentieth-century rhetorical
thought”).
13. In addition to numerous articles, Burke’s corpus includes eight books. This
Article will follow the practice of Burke scholars by citing his books by their
abbreviations. See KENNETH BURKE, ATTITUDES TOWARD HISTORY (3d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter BURKE, ATH]; KENNETH BURKE, COUNTER-STATEMENT (3d ed. 1968)
[hereinafter BURKE, CS]; KENNETH BURKE, LANGUAGE AS SYMBOLIC ACTION: ESSAYS ON LIFE,
LITERATURE, AND METHOD (1966) [hereinafter BURKE, LASA]; KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR
OF MOTIVES (Cal. ed. 1969) [hereinafter BURKE, GM]; KENNETH BURKE, PERMANENCE AND
CHANGE: AN ANATOMY OF PURPOSE (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter BURKE, PC]; KENNETH BURKE,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LITERARY FORM (3d ed. 1974) [hereinafter BURKE, PLF]; KENNETH
BURKE, A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES (Cal. ed. 1969) [hereinafter BURKE, RM]; KENNETH BURKE,
THE RHETORIC OF RELIGION: STUDIES IN LOGOLOGY (1970). See WILLIAM H. RUECKERT,
KENNETH BURKE AND THE DRAMA OF HUMAN RELATIONS vii-viii (2d ed. 1983).
14. E.g., BURKE, ATH, supra note 13, at 225 (describing how imaginative
possibilities become “bureaucratized” when they are enacted in “the realities of a
social texture,” such as “the methods of government, production and distribution”);
BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 174 (explaining how “the legal fiction that financial
corporations are persons” is a type of “casuistic stretching”); BURKE, RM, supra note
13, at 44 (noting that the “ways of identification that contribute variously to social
cohesion” can be “for the advantage of special groups whose rights and duties are
indeterminately both a benefit and a tax on the community, as with some business
enterprise in our society”).
15. Laurence Coupe, Kenneth Burke: Pioneer of Ecocriticism, 35 J. AM. STUD. 413
(2001); see Randall Roorda, KB in Green: Ecology, Critical Theory, and Kenneth Burke,
4 INTERDISC. STUD. LITERATURE & ENV’T 39, 39 (1997) (calling Kenneth Burke the “first
critical ecologist”); Phaedra C. Pezzullo, Unearthing the Marvelous: Environmental
Imprints on Rhetorical Criticism, 16 REV. COMMC’N 25, 33 (2016) (claiming that
environmental rhetoricians have employed Burkean analytical methods for over
three decades).
16. FRANK LENTRICCHIA, CRITICISM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 31 (1983); see BURKE, ATH,
supra note 13, at 266–67 (writing that his theory of rhetoric as identification “is
hardly other than a name for the function of sociality.”).
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the abstract language of sustainable development creates false
identifications that hinder the implementation of tangible actions, and
second to recommend correctives in the form of alternative tropes
that can re-orient perspectives.
Part II summarizes key aspects of Burke’s critical method.
Because people understand concepts only through words, language
acts as a “terministic screen” that can filter perceptions.17 One such
filter—which Burke calls the rhetoric of substance—occurs when
words suggest a shared identity that does not exist, as when
negotiators agree “in principle.”18 Indeed, legal concepts are
particularly problematic because they are “mixed dead metaphors”
that compound abstraction.19 Bogus identifications built around
abstract concepts reinforce existing power structures by deflecting
attention away from the possibilities suggested by other terms.20 One
corrective action is therefore recourse to literary devices like tropes
to achieve new perspectives by considering an issue through different
and even seemingly irrelevant or contradictory concepts.21
Part III then applies this theory to the discourse of sustainable
development. In the 1980s, critics recognized that economic
development contributed to environmental and social harms, which
the fragmented areas of law were insufficient to correct. Sustainable
development therefore provided a broad term sufficient to unite three
otherwise distinct interests.22 Its greatest successes, however, are
limited to general agreement “in principle” or to treaty frameworks
with only the vague potential for substantive results.23 Moreover, the
concepts of the three pillars and the triple bottom line are mixed dead
metaphors that increase abstraction and thus make it harder to
perceive problems. For example, the implementation of public
private partnerships (PPPs) and the generation of private ESG metrics
benefit those in power: by agreeing to what seem like compromises
but are actually business as usual, stakeholders maintain the status
quo rather than change it.24
Part IV re-orients the perspective towards sustainable
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

BURKE, LASA, supra note 13, at 44–62.
BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 52; see infra Part II.A.
BURKE, ATH, supra note 13, at 229–32.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.

5

422

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 42.2

development, not only to recover the luster that has dimmed in the
generation-plus since its inception but also to animate its underlying
metaphors into a critical tool, one that law- and policy-makers and
businesses can use to identify problems, think creatively about
solutions, and then implement them. This reorientation is via tropes.
For example, metonymy works through tangible references for an
abstract concept, synecdoche treats a part for the whole, and irony
mandates the consideration of multiple—even conflicting—
perspectives. This Part applies these tropes as correctives for the
problems raised in Part III. The Article ends with a brief conclusion.
II.

FROM FALSE IDENTIFICATIONS TO TROPOLOGICAL CORRECTIVES: A
SURVEY OF BURKE’S RHETORIC

For Burke, “the basic function of rhetoric [is] the use of words by
human agents to form attitudes or to induce actions in other human
agents . . . .”25 More specifically, people employ symbols—language—
to “induc[e] cooperation.”26 Since we cannot say anything without the
use of language, language acts as a terministic screen, which is “an
orientation to discourse that promotes some views, reactions, and
statements while it ‘filter[s]’ out others.”27 Terministic screens are
problematic when they establish a commonality that does not exist;
for example, vague terms can suggest a shared identity while
simultaneously deflecting attention away from the material divisions
among stakeholders. This problem of terms also has a corrective in
language, such as the literary language of tropes that can re-orient
discourse by generating new, unusual, but also potentially
constructive perspectives.
A.

Identification, Terministic Screens, and the Rhetoric of
Substance

One entrée into Burke’s sophisticated theory of rhetoric is his
concept of identification.28 Humans differ from animals because of
25. BURKE, RM, supra note 13, at 41.
26. Id. at 43 (calling rhetoric “the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing
cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols”).
27. Lynda Walsh, A Zero-Sum Politics of Identification: A Topological Analysis of
Wildlife Advocacy Rhetoric in the Mexican Gray Wolf Reintroduction Project, 36
WRITTEN COMMC’N 437, 447 (2019) (quoting BURKE, LASA, supra note 13, at 46); see
BURKE, LASA, supra note 13, at 50.
28. See Don J. Kraemer, The Reasonable and the Sensible: Toward a Rhetorical
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our use of language and our ability to use symbols that ascribe
meaning to things, to each other, and to our world.29 Indeed, if
language were somehow removed so that we were left in a natural,
biological state, persons would feel estranged from each other.30
Language therefore provides the “[r]esources of classification, of
abstraction, of comparison and contrast, of merger and division, [and]
of derivation”31 with which humans create order and thus transcend
this natural state.32
This transcendence via the use of language is both internal and
external.33 Considered internally, language is the “substance” that
helps us to identify ourselves and our place in our surroundings.34
The word “substance” has a common dictionary definition of a person
or thing’s “most important element . . . [or] main part.”35 Split
etymologically, however, “sub-stance” is a word that suggests context,
the “something that stands beneath or supports the person or thing.”36
The properties of “symbolic communication” therefore “characterize
both ‘the human situation’ and what men are ‘in themselves.’”37
Considered externally, language is essential for socialization, for
building and maintaining social structures.38 Humans seek not only
to uncover and understand their own substance but also to identify
Theory of Justice, 46 PHILOS. & RHET. 207, 214 (2013) [hereinafter Kraemer,
Reasonable] (calling “identification” the “key term in Burke’s rhetoric theory”).
29. See BURKE, LASA, supra note 13, at 16 (calling man “the symbol-using
(symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal”) (emphasis omitted).
30. See BARBARA A. BIESECKER, ADDRESSING POSTMODERNITY: KENNETH BURKE,
RHETORIC, AND A THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE 46 (2000).
31. BURKE, RM, supra note 13, at 285.
32. See BIESECKER, supra note 30, at 46–47; BURKE, RM, supra note 13, at 23
(writing about the possibility of rhetoric moving us “to the universal”); Kraemer,
Reasonable, supra note 28, at 215 (writing that “Burkean identification joins body and
ideology”).
33. See BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 33 (“[S]ymbolic communication is not a
merely external instrument, but also intrinsic to men as agents.”).
34. See ROBERT L. HEATH, REALISM AND RELATIVISM: A PERSPECTIVE ON KENNETH BURKE
169 (1986) (“Burke’s dialectic . . . demonstrates how linguistic transformation rests
solely in the nature of terministic substance.”).
35. BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 21–22 (quoting Webster’s Revised Unabridged
Dictionary).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 33.
38. See Courtney Megan Cahill, “If Sex Offenders Can Marry, Then Why Not Gays
and Lesbians?”: An Essay on the Progressive Comparative Argument, 55 BUFF. L. REV.
777, 800–01 (2007) (quoting BURKE, RM, supra note 13, at 43) (writing that rhetoric
can “enable group cooperation, build social networks, and even ‘assist[] the survival
of cultures by promoting social cohesion.’”).
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with others in a way that demonstrates a shared substance, or in
Burke’s term, to become “consubstantial” via “common sensations,
concepts, images, ideas, attitudes.”39 Burke writes, “A is not identical
with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is
identified with B. Or he may identify himself with B even when their
interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to
believe so.”40 As a means of socialization, identification allows A to
“remain[] unique” while also being “‘substantially one’ with a person
other than himself.”41 For Burke, identification is more than just one
individual identifying with another; instead, it is the “historical
process whereby a condition of impossibility (the irreducible
estrangement of the individual) is dialectically transformed or
sublated into a condition of possibility (sociality) by way of
rhetoric.”42 As one Burke commentator writes, the social has its “very
mode of existence” in the rhetorical exchange of symbols.43 The
rhetorical process of identification therefore enables individuals to
unite as a society.44
While identification enables people to unite as a society, one
could also take Burke’s claim that “[i]dentification is compensatory to
division” as a warning: “the social appears not as a perfectly
39. BURKE, RM, supra note 13, at 21; see also M. JIMMIE KILLINGSWORTH & JACQUELINE
S. PALMER, ECOSPEAK: RHETORIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN AMERICA 23 (1992)
(“Kenneth Burke’s chief contribution to rhetorical theory was the concept of
identification as the means by which a speaker or writer puts forth an image or
character . . . and invites the audience to participate in a consubstantial relationship
with that image.”).
40. BURKE, RM, supra note 13, at 20.
41. Id. at 21; see also BURKE, ATH, supra note 13, at 266–67 (“In fact,
‘identification’ is hardly other than a name for the function of sociality.”).
42. BIESECKER, supra note 30, at 48; see also id. at 59 (“[I]n the Rhetoric the
movement of the dialectic guarantees the emergence of the social, the provisional
sublation of the individual into the collective.”); BURKE, RM, supra note 13, at 39
(claiming that there is an “ingredient of rhetoric in all socialization” because “[t]he
individual person, striving to form himself in accordance with the communicative
norms that match the cooperative ways of his society, is by the same token concerned
with the rhetoric of identification.”).
43. BIESECKER, supra note 30, at 50.
44. See BIESECKER, supra note 30, at 21 (calling rhetoric “the condition of
possibility for collective human action”); Lawrence J. Prelli & Terri S. Winters,
Rhetorical Features of Green Evangelicalism, 3 ENV’T COMMC’N 224, 227 (2009)
(“Pursuit of identification involves searching for and exhibiting terminological and
other symbolic properties shared with others, properties that screen situations in
ways that imply mutual adherence to the substance of a point of view.”); see also
Kenneth Burke, Dramatism, in COMMUNICATION: CONCEPTS AND PERSPECTIVES 327, 331
(Lee Thayer ed., 1967) (writing that every terminology suggests possibilities)
[hereinafter Burke, Dramatism].
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egalitarian space of cooperation but always and already as a field
necessarily fraught with factional strife.”45 It is “precisely because
there is division” that we need identification as a compensation: “[i]f
men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the
rhetorician to proclaim their unity.”46 Burke does not propose that
identification is merely the use of “deliberate cunning”47 via linguistic
devices with “which speakers trick, manipulate, or even deceive their
audience into identifying with them and into doing what they want.”48
Instead, he recognizes the disconnect between reality and language,
how humans can conceive of and communicate about reality only
“through various media of symbolism.”49 The potential for deception
and misunderstanding therefore resides in language itself: “much that
we take as observations about ‘reality’ may be but the spinning out of
possibilities implicit in our particular choice of terms.”50
Burke thus argues that words are “terministic screens” between
reality and our perception of it, so that different terms lead to
different perceptions.51 “Even if any given terminology is a reflection
of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of
reality; and to this extent it must function as a deflection of reality.”52
All language use—whether the speaker has the intent to deceive or
not—requires a choice of terms, and the choice of “nomenclature
45. BIESECKER, supra note 30, at 49; see BURKE, RM, supra note 13, at 22–23
(claiming that the “ideal culminations” of rhetoric “are more often beset by strife as
the condition of their organized expression, or material embodiment” and calling
division the “ironic counterpart” of identification); Matthew Ortoleva, “We Face East”:
The Narragansett Dawn and Ecocentric Discourses of Identity and Justice, in ROUTLEDGE
STUDIES IN RHETORIC AND COMMUNICATION: ENVIRONMENTAL RHETORIC AND ECOLOGIES OF PLACE
84, 84 (2013) (Peter N. Goggin ed., 2013) (“[T]he public sphere is a space of conflict,
imbued with power structures and saturated with domination and subordination.”).
46. BURKE, RM, supra note 13, at 22; see Delia B. Conti, Narrative Theory and the
Law: A Rhetorician’s Invitation to the Legal Academy, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 457, 459 (2001)
(“Inducing cooperation is only necessary because man is divided . . . .”).
47. BURKE, RM, supra note 13, at 45 (recognizing the possibility of “deliberate
cunning” when “an identification favorable to the speaker or his cause is made to
seem favorable to the audience”); see also id. at 23 (warning about “the lugubrious
regions of malice and the lie”).
48. Cahill, supra note 38, at 800; see Bill Bridges, Terministic Screens, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC AND COMPOSITION: COMMUNICATION FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE
INFORMATION AGE 722, 723 (Theresa Enos ed., 1996) (writing that Burke called
attention to how terministic screens could “manipulate us”).
49. BURKE, LASA, supra note 13, at 52 (writing that “all members of our species
conceive of reality somewhat roundabout, through various media of symbolism”).
50. Id. at 46.
51. See, e.g., id. at 44–62.
52. Id. at 45.
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necessarily directs the attention into some channels rather than
others.”53 If the same situation were stated in different terms, those
competing terminologies would affect the audience’s perception of
that situation.54 Consider Burke’s analogy of several photographs of
the same object, with the only difference being that each was taken
with a different color filter; even for “something so factual as a
photograph,” those filters revealed distinct textures and forms.55 “The
choice of one term over another can emphasize certain features and
deemphasize others or direct the attention toward one meaning but
exclude other meanings that alternate terms would suggest.”56 All
language is “inherently rhetorical because its use is necessarily
selective and partial” since we must make decisions about “what
meanings to reveal and conceal, disclose and foreclose.”57
In the realm of law and policy, debates will be framed in terms
that are well-established,58 which results in a “screening effect”
because dominant metaphors and common topics will limit “the
perceptions of discourse participants.”59 For example, the selection of
ambiguous terms that suggest identification can deflect attention
away from divisions legitimately established by another set of
terms.60 Take Burke’s example of the expression that something is
“substantially true”; the inclusion of this adverb allows the rhetor to
53. Id.
54. See id. at 46 (claiming that “many of [our]‘observations’ are but implications
of the particular terminology in terms of which the observations are made”).
55. Id. at 45.
56. Jeff Todd, The (De)Mystification of Environmental Injustice: A Dramatistic
Analysis of Law, 93 TEMPLE L. REV. 597, 605 (2021); see also Nils Peterson et al.,
Rearticulating the Myth of Human-Wildlife Conflict, 3 CONSERVATION LETTERS 74, 74–75
(2010) (“[V]ocabularies form terministic screens, wherein individual words (terms)
interact to emphasize some aspects of reality, while deemphasizing others . . .
Terministic screens, therefore, direct attention by emphasizing or deemphasizing
different elements of reality.”); Prelli & Winters, supra note 44, at 226 (writing that
“the choice of one term over another directs the attention toward one meaning but
excludes other meanings that could have been suggested by other terms”).
57. Prelli & Winters, supra note 44, at 226; see BURKE, LASA, supra note 13, at 45
(“The dramatistic view of language, in terms of ‘symbolic action,’ is exercised about
the necessarily suasive nature of even the most unemotional scientific
nomenclature.”); Susan E. Provenzano, How Rhetoric Reveals Judicial Motives in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 90 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022–23)
(manuscript at 6) (writing that “thoughts and ideas are never free from the language
used to frame them”).
58. See Burke, Dramatism, supra note 44, at 341.
59. Todd, supra note 56, at 605 (citing Walsh, supra note 27, at 447); see HEATH,
supra note 34, at 90–91 (writing that terministic screens “limit our perceptions”).
60. See, e.g., Todd, supra note 56, at 601.
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identify something as “true” even if the evidence does not confirm it
to be thus.61 This “linguistic resource” allows for power through
ambiguity because advocates can avoid definitive statements while
proffering the suggestion that things are a certain way.62 Another
example of the rhetoric of substance is “in principle,” which allows
speakers to accept a proposal or proposition while avoiding
commitment or even overlooking a lack of proof.63
Terministic screens are particularly problematic when they lack
“telltale expressions” like “substantially” or “in principle.”64 As one
relevant example that involves the law, consider:
[A] list of citizens’ signatures had been collected for a petition
asking that a certain politician’s name be placed on the ballot. In court
it was shown that some of these signatures were genuine, but that a
great many others were false. Thereupon the judge invalidated the lot
on the grounds that, the whole list being a mixture of the false and the
genuine, it was “saturated” with fraud. He here ruled in effect that the
list was substantially or essentially fraudulent. The judgment was
reversed by a higher court which ruled that, since the required
number of genuine signatures had been obtained, the false signatures
should be simply ignored. That is, the genuine signatures should be
considered in themselves, not contextually.65
Such substantial identifications are not limited to modifiers like
adjectives and adverbs but also lurk in simple terms; for example,
Burke calls the collective pronoun “we” a “wonder-word” because it
obscures distinctions.66 In short, even “[t]he most clear-sounding of
words can thus be used for the vaguest of reference.”67
Identification thus operates in ways that are inclusive and
exclusive, and this operation is simultaneous. The formation and
maintenance of social identities based on a “common ideology” will
“at the same time exclud[e] alternate terms, other groups, and
competing ideologies.”68 This has ironic results because “we obscure
61. BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 52.
62. See id.; see also George Cheney et al., Kenneth Burke’s Implicit Theory of
Power, in KENNETH BURKE AND THE 21ST CENTURY 133, 135 (Bernard L. Brock ed., 1999)
(“Burke directs our attention . . . to the many meanings and ambiguities of power that
symbols introduce into human experience.”).
63. See BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 52.
64. Id. at 52–53.
65. Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
66. BURKE, PC, supra note 13, at 305–06.
67. BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 52.
68. Patricia Bizzell & Bruce Herzberg, THE RHETORICAL TRADITION: READINGS FROM
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difference even as we revel in difference” and “deepen exclusion”
though seeming to find “greater inclusiveness.”69 For example, in
debates about environmental issues related to development, the use
of polarizing, “us-versus-them” language can suggest alliances that do
not in fact exist (as when a community group opposes a project, but
some members of the community desire the jobs created by that
project).70 Perhaps most problematic, “ambiguous discourse . . .
enabl[es] the powerful to protect their privileged status—deflecting
attention away from class distinctions via the assertion of a common
interest with the powerless.”71 The next Subpart takes up this
phenomenon in the context of legal concepts.
B.

Efficiency, Casuistry, and the Mixed Dead Metaphors of Law

Burke addresses the rhetoric of law throughout his works.72 Few
commentators—whether in the law, humanities, or social sciences—
have addressed his concept of the law, however, so this aspect of his
theory remains “underdeveloped.”73 This Subpart therefore builds on
the previous one by surveying Burke’s writings about law and
rhetoric to show how “the law is a terministic screen that molds
reality by creating abstract identifications that gloss over actual

CLASSICAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 1295–96 (2d ed. 2001); see HEATH, supra note 34, at 91
(quoting BURKE, PC, supra note 13, at 102) (“[A] given classification . . . produces new
alignments incongruous with the alignments flowing from other modes of
classification.”); Prelli & Winters, supra note 44, at 227 (“Burke also points out that
whenever we come to terms regarding a situation’s meaning with some we risk
division from others who regard that situation from vantages afforded by different
terms.”).
69. Don J. Kraemer, Between Motion and Action: The Dialectical Role of Affective
Identification in Kenneth Burke, 16 ADVANCES HIST. RHETORIC 141, 160 (2013)
[hereinafter Kraemer, Between].
70. See KILLINGSWORTH & PALMER, supra note 39, at 29–33; Peterson et al., supra
note 56, at 75 (“Terministic screens shape the way society reacts to environmental
challenges by constraining possibilities.”).
71. Todd, supra note 56, at 610 (citing James L. Kastely, Love and Strife: Ultimate
Motives in Burke's A Rhetoric of Motives, 31 RHETORICA: J. HIST. RHETORIC 172, 196–97
(2013)).
72. See, e.g., id. at 601.
73. See id. at 601 & n.20 (citing Thomas Meisenhelder, Law as Symbolic Action:
Kenneth Burke’s Sociology of Law, 4 SYMB. INTERACTION 43, 53 (1981)) (finding “only
one sustained treatment of Burke’s writings on law, which . . . ignores Burke’s
definition of law as ‘the efficient codification of custom’ and the role of casuistic
stretching.”); id. (citations omitted) (claiming that “only a handful [of legal scholars]
have referenced [Burke’s concepts of] justice and law, and then only in passing”).
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divisions.”74
Burke defines law as “the efficient codification of custom,”75 a
definition that invites further consideration of the term “efficient.” In
the context of identification, “efficient” refers to the conscious
“selection” and “deflection”—or, stated more bluntly, the
manipulation—of terministic screens.76 This operation flows from
the reality that one “cannot say everything at once”; accordingly, one’s
statements “throw strong light upon something, and in the process
cast other things into shadow.”77 Burke offers a literary analogy to the
Cheshire Cat in Alice in Wonderland, which starts fully-formed, but
then everything except for its broad smile slowly vanishes so that the
smile is “pure” or “efficient” since it—and only it—draws the
audience’s attention.78 Applied to language use, this metaphor
demonstrates how efficiency is the isolation of “one quality, making it
the whole of life,” so that one is “left in possession of an unadulterated
smile, the smiliness of smile, an ‘efficient,’ abstract essence.”79 For an
example of efficiency in the law, consider the “lawyer’s brief”: because
an attorney does not write about a legal issue as a disinterested
observer but as an advocate for one party in a dispute, the brief
“adopts a simple criterion for stressing certain considerations and
omitting others.”80 The purpose is therefore not to give a neutral
assessment of the issue so that the audience can grasp “the true
proportions of a situation”; rather, the lawyer’s brief is a work of
“planned disproportion” that in advocating for a certain position can
hinder a more complete understanding.81
Efficiency is not limited to the adversary system of litigation but
is an aspect of all law, particularly in its relationship with another
concept, casuistic stretching.82 The law is dynamic because it evolves
in response to changing material situations.83 That change comes
74. Id. at 614.
75. BURKE, ATH, supra note 13, at 291.
76. See BURKE, LASA, supra note 13, at 45; Todd, supra note 56, at 613 (“He treats
‘efficiency’ as the aspect of language whereby one manipulates terministic screens.”).
77. BURKE, ATH, supra note 13, at 248.
78. See id. at 249.
79. Id.; see HEATH, supra note 34, at 46 (citing BURKE, CS, supra note 13, at 165)
(describing the standard for eloquence in an artistic work as efficiency, whether each
line reinforces the work’s themes through strong symbols and formal effects).
80. BURKE, ATH, supra note 13, at 249.
81. Todd, supra note 56, at 613 (quoting BURKE, ATH, supra note 13, at 249–50).
82. See generally id. at 608.
83. See BURKE, ATH, supra note 13, at 291.
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with rhetorical challenges, such as when an abstract concept lacks
specific terms that can be “subsumed in it,” or the opposite problem
of showing a relationship between two conflicting terms that lack a
higher-order abstract term to unite them.84 Casuistic stretching is the
transference of words “from one category of associations to
another.”85 Thus, it is a type of metaphorical extension that “fills the
lacunae through reasoning by analogy.”86 Through this process, “one
introduces new principles while theoretically remaining faithful to
old principles.”87 New laws are considered just when based upon
established legal concepts88—even when those concepts are
imperfect fits. For example, judges draw on legal precedent to
support their decisions, but opinions that worked well in a prior
generation may not be adequate for contemporary circumstances and
changing social norms.89 Judges and other lawmakers also sometimes
reference “justice” and “higher law,” idealizations that are so abstract
that they can be used to support either side of a disputed issue.90 Law
therefore develops not by responding to material conditions but to
“the kind of ‘immutable scene’ that could be idealized and generalized
84. Id. at 231; see also BURKE, PC, supra note 13, at 103–05 (discussing
abstraction as a process where one “draws from” old classifications and extends them
to new situations and contexts that are not sanctioned by previous usages).
85. BURKE, ATH, supra note 13, at 230.
86. Todd, supra note 56, at 612.
87. BURKE, ATH, supra note 13, at 229.
88. See Jeff Todd, A “Sense of Equity” in Environmental Justice Litigation, 44 HARV.
ENV’T L. REV. 169, 202–03 (2020).
89. See BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 379 (arguing that precedent should lead to
an opposite result since “the scenic conditions are now so different from those when
the precedent was established”); NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A
THEORY OF LEGAL REASONING 91 (2005) (arguing that a legal system based on precedent
needs “an overall coherence of values and principles, enduring through time”); CHAÏM
PERELMAN, JUSTICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT: ESSAYS ON MORAL AND LEGAL REASONING 92–93
(John Petrie et al. trans., 1980) (writing that a rule that was considered reasonable
when it was established may no longer be so when conditions change); id. at 39
(“[T]he evolution of moral sentiment may result in the fact that certain distinctions,
neglected by legislators or judges, become essential in the present evaluation of the
facts.”); Todd, supra note 88, at 211 (writing that when conditions change and social
norms shift, “laws that were reasonable when formulated might now be inadequate
to correct injustice”).
90. BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 173; see also CHAÏM PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE
AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT 4–7 (John Petrie trans., 1963) (calling justice a
“confused notion” and listing six different conceptions of justice); JAMES CROSSWHITE,
DEEP RHETORIC: PHILOSOPHY, REASON, VIOLENCE, JUSTICE, WISDOM 303 (2013) (“Although
the formal rule of justice enjoins us to treat people in the same way, the idea of justice
contains several incompatible notions of what the essential consideration should
be.”).
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in terms of ‘eternal truth, equity and justice.’”91 Such casuistic
stretching can lead to deception because “legal fictions and judicial
‘interpretations’ . . . further serve to bridge the gap between principle
and reality.”92
Burke elaborates on the problem of legal analogizing through
abstraction: “The abstract resources of law are implicit in speech. For
abstractions are dead metaphors. You build abstractions atop the
abstractions by mixed dead metaphors. And thinkers can even coach
the language, deliberately inventing new abstractions, after the
analogy of usages already established.”93 Metaphor is a trope in which
one thing is stated in terms of another, and these are usually two
“distinctly different” things.94 “Metaphor reflects ‘a transaction
between contexts’” because the audience takes a familiar concept that
it then “maps on top of the new experience.”95 If two or more
metaphors are “mixed,” then that means that “obviously diverse
metaphoric vehicles” are combined in a mash-up.96 Sometimes the
combination is merely ludicrous—”Girding up his loins, the chairman
plowed through the mountainous agenda”97—but this mixture can
also result in confusion.98 And if a metaphor is “dead,” then its
reference to the “corporeal, visible, and tangible” has been
“forgotten.”99 For example, telling a very young child that a table has
legs might induce thoughts of walking furniture; for adults, however,
this metaphor has become so standard that it is a cliché with no power
to capture attention and inspire us to think about the comparison.100
Mixed dead metaphors intensify abstraction, “thus blurring the ability
91. BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 379–80.
92. BURKE, ATH, supra note 13, at 291; see id. at 232 (writing about “the many
deceptions we have attributed to casuistic stretching”).
93. Id. at 291; see Kristen K. Davis, The Rhetoric of Accommodation: Considering
the Language of the Work-Family Discourse, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 530, 530 n.3 (2007)
(“According to Burke, law is a resource . . . to invent new abstractions by analogy to
existing abstractions . . . .”).
94. M. H. ABRAMS & GEOFFREY GALT HARPHAM, A GLOSSARY OF LITERARY TERMS 133
(11th ed. 2015).
95. Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical
Choices in Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV.
949, 955 (2007) (quoting I.A. RICHARDS, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC 94 (1936)).
96. ABRAMS & HARPHAM, supra note 94, at 134.
97. Id.
98. See Jonathan K. Van Patten, Metaphors and Persuasion, 58 S.D. L. REV. 295,
302 (2013).
99. BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 506; see Van Patten, supra note 98, at 301–02
(calling dead metaphors clichés because they are “worn out”).
100. See ABRAMS & HARPHAM, supra note 94, at 134.
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to see that the two purportedly similar concepts do not have much in
common after all.”101 Rephrased as a terministic screen, “the selection
of legal language deflects attention away from material reality and
directs it toward the abstract.”102 Because the law and legal reasoning
are analogical,103 the law can rest upon weak analogies that are
obscured by abstraction.
The greater concern is the question of what, exactly, gets
obscured. Answering this question requires remembering that law,
like all language, has a socializing function. The law does not exist in
a vacuum but must be enacted “in the realities of a social texture, in
all the complexity of language and habits, in the property
relationships, the methods of government, production and
distribution, and in the development of rituals that re-enforce the
same emphasis.”104
That term “emphasis” brings us back to Burke’s definition of law
as “the efficient codification of custom” and his treatment of
“efficiency” as throwing light upon certain factors while keeping
others in the dark.105 The law’s emphasis appears to be maintaining a
social order in which everybody shares—or in Burkean language, in
which we are consubstantial—as with our Constitutional “more
perfect Union” or international human rights law that establishes the
same rights for all.106 Another emphasis lurks in the shadows cast by
that spotlight, however: the “hierarchical stratification” of the status

101. Todd, supra note 56, at 614.
102. Id. at 612.
103. See Louise A. Halper, Tropes of Anxiety and Desire: Metaphor and Metonymy
in the Law of Takings, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.’S 31, 36 (1996) (claiming that the common
law is “constructed by analogy and representation . . . [and] is comparison and
representation.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 741, 741 (1993) (“Reasoning by analogy is the most familiar form of legal
reasoning.”).
104. BURKE, ATH, supra note 13, at 225; see Cheney et al., supra note 62, at 136
(claiming that language has the ability to develop a complex human social order and
corresponding ideas of status and property).
105. See sources cited supra note 73.
106. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see also Todd, supra note 56, at 616–17; BURKE, GM, supra
note 13, at 249 (writing that the “generalized rights or duties” of a constitution “may
be considered as a grand promissory unity”); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Environmental
Justice, Human Rights, and the Global South, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 151, 173 (2015)
(arguing that international human rights law uses neutral and universal language to
establish “the same right to life, health, food, water, privacy, [and] a healthy
environment”); Meisenhelder, supra note 73, at 49 (writing that the Constitution
“proclaims for us a common substance that transcends our material
differentiations”).
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quo.107 One Burke commentator writes that hierarchy is continually,
and often indirectly, reinforced “in some veiled ‘social allegory,’ in
overt and covert metaphors, in all kinds of seemingly non-hierarchic
symbols which turn out to be secretly charged with ‘judgments of
status’ through identification with something in the socio-political
hierarchy . . . .”108 After all, the Constitution’s terms are inherently
divisive since it is the supreme law of the land that reserves some
power to the states with any remainder “to the people,”109 and one
critic claims that the “benevolent rhetoric” of human rights law
“cloaks . . . acts of domination.”110
The language of law thus unites the powerful and the
disempowered in an image of unity “so the law legitimates power by
inducing the audience to feel a part of a union with those at the top.”111
Legal institutions thereby “contribute to reproduce and maintain
inequality in ways which are neither obvious nor obviously
coercive.”112 Stated more bluntly, abstract language can mask how
new laws do not result in change but instead maintain the status quo
“by assuming or asserting a common identity when no such identity
exists.”113
C.

The Four Master Tropes: Devices for Perspective by Incongruity

While the preceding discussion might suggest that figurative
language like metaphor is problematic, it need not be so. After all,
language use is inherently metaphoric: terms represent some thing or
concept, and the very act of definition requires using other terms to
describe the term under consideration.114 Further, it is mixed dead
107. BURKE, RM, supra note 13, at 313; see Todd, supra note 56, at 617.
108. RUECKERT, supra note 13, at 142; see Cheney et al., supra note 62, at 141
(“[P]ower is ‘invested’ in social systems, such as bureaucracies, and that power is
often not easily identified with individual actors[.]”).
109. Todd, supra note 56, at 616–17 (citing, inter alia, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl.
2; see also id. amend. X); see Conti, supra note 46, at 461 (noting the “basic
divisiveness inherent in [the Constitution’s] terms”).
110. Gonzalez, supra note 106, at 173.
111. Todd, supra note 56, at 617 (citing Kastely, supra note 71, 196–97;
Meisenhelder, supra note 73, at 53).
112. Yong Ryung Lee, Empirical Study of the Symbolic Function of Law: The Legal
Treatment of Koreans in Japan, 7 INT’L J. INTERDISC. CIVIC & POL. STUDS. 13, 14 (2014); see
also Meisenhelder, supra note 73, at 54–55.
113. Kastely, supra note 71, at 196.
114. See BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 33; BURKE, LASA, supra note 13, at 14
(calling the “second-level aspect of human symbolism” our use of “words about words
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metaphors that create confusion and intensify abstraction; used
appropriately, literary devices can help achieve better clarity and new
understanding.115 Consider that metaphor by definition is not a
comparison between two obviously similar things but between two
“distinctly different” things that nevertheless have some crucial
aspect in common.116 Metaphor and all tropes require an active
audience and thereby give that audience credit: the reader or hearer
recognizes a disjunction and has to slow down and work through
potential meanings to reconcile that disjunction.117 A rhetorical critic
can similarly explore a subject through various tropes—including
irony, which is a trope of incongruities—to gain new perspectives on
that subject.118 This Subpart therefore summarizes Burke’s four
master tropes of metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony as
critical tools that achieve “perspective by incongruity.”119
(as with the definitions of a dictionary)”); Burke, Dramatism, supra note 44, at 339
(writing that any symbol system that describes the nonsymbolic must speak of things
in terms of what they are not).
115. See generally T. Bahti & J. C. Mann, Trope, in THE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
POETRY & POETICS 1463, 1464 (Roland Greene & Stephen Cushman eds., 4th ed. 2012)
(citing RICHARDS, supra note 95) (“[M]etaphor allows two or more ideas to be carried
by a single word or expression” and that the meaning “result[s] from their
‘interaction’ on the basis of a relation . . . .”). See also W. Martin, Metaphor, in THE
PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY & POETICS, supra, at 863, 863 (calling metaphor “[a]
trope . . . in which a word or phrase is shifted from its normal uses to a context where
it evokes new meanings”); Linda L. Berger, The Lady, or the Tiger? A Field Guide to
Metaphor and Narrative, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 275, 279 (2011) (“Conceptual metaphor is
equally effective for understanding and reasoning about the abstract concepts that
often underlie legal arguments.”).
116. ABRAMS & HARPHAM, supra note 94, at 133.
117. See WAYNE C. BOOTH, A RHETORIC OF IRONY 10–12 (1974) (describing how
irony functions when the reader rejects a literal meaning and then searches for
alternatives that are “more secure”); see also Jeff Todd, Satire in Defamation Law:
Toward a Critical Understanding, 35 REV. LITIG. 45, 57 (2016) (“[T]ropes depend upon
rhetorical identification for their effectiveness: the audience recognizes the outsized
distortion, questions whether the author intends it as true, and then attempts to
resolve the ambiguity by finding alternative meanings.”); see, e.g., BURKE, ATH, supra
note 13, at 249–50 (“[The lawyer’s] tactics can assist us to understand the world only
insofar as we know how to discount them by considering the interests behind his
caricature. We understand the true proportions of a situation not on the basis of the
work itself, but by making allowances for the planned disproportion.”).
118. See BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 503 (employing tropes as a critical tool for
“the discovery and description of ‘the truth’”).
119. BURKE, PC, supra note 13, at 90 (writing that perspective by incongruity
involves “taking a word usually applied to one setting and transferring its use to
another setting,” thereby “violating the ‘proprieties’ of the word in its previous
linkages” to “exemplify[] relationships between objects which our customary rational
vocabulary has ignored”); see also ANN GEORGE, KENNETH BURKE’S PERMANENCE AND
CHANGE: A CRITICAL COMPANION 30 (2018) (calling perspective by incongruity “an

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol42/iss2/5

18

2022

A RHETORIC OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

435

Buke calls metaphor “perspective,” a “device for seeing
something in terms of something else.”120 Metaphor “brings out the
thisness of a that, or the thatness of a this.”121 It therefore creates a
transaction between contexts: by mapping a new concept on top of
another concept that it already knows, the audience comes to
understand the new concept.122
Because all four tropes involve comparison (and, simultaneously,
contrast), the other three tropes are “species” of metaphor.123 Take
metonymy, which is “the reduction of some higher or more complex
realm of being to the terms of a lower or less complex realm of
being.”124 For example, emotion is a complex concept, yet we can
reduce that concept to a physical organ of the body—the heart—as a
more concrete expression.125 In a sense, metonymy is merely a type
of metaphor because it compares two seemingly unlike things;
however, metonymy also has a role in resurrecting dead
metaphors.126 All language is “metaphorical extension”: as humans
develop “incorporeal, invisible, and intangible” ideas, we borrow
words from the realm of the “corporeal, visible, and tangible.”127 As
the “original corporeal reference is forgotten” over time, the word for
the intangible concept becomes a dead metaphor.128 Metonymy thus
functions to “reverse” the metaphorical extension “back from the
intangible into a tangible equivalent.”129
A “reduction is [also] a representation,” with “the act of
perception” equivalent to “the thing perceived”; thus, metonymy leads
to a consideration of synecdoche.130 Synecdoche means to substitute
the “part for the whole, whole for the part, container for the contained,
sign for the thing signified, material for the thing made, . . . cause for
overarching term for a series of critical methodologies and rhetorical strategies
designed to overcome pious resistance to social change”).
120. BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 503.
121. Id.
122. See Berger, supra note 95, at 955; see also Van Patten, supra note 98, at 299.
123. ABRAMS & HARPHAM, supra note 94, at 134 (“Some tropes, sometimes
classified as species of metaphor, are more frequently and usefully given names of
their own.”); see BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 503.
124. BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 506.
125. See id.
126. See ABRAMS & HARPHAM, supra note 94, at 134 (“Many dead metaphors,
however, are only moribund and can be brought back to life.”).
127. BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 506.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 507.
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effect, effect for cause, genus for species, species for genus, etc.” 131
Two examples are referring to “‘ten hands’ for ten workers, or ‘a
hundred sails’ for ships and, in current slang, ‘wheels’ to stand for an
automobile.”132 These examples suggest how metonymy differs from
synecdoche. With the former, the substituted image is independent of
the subject that it represents, and that subject is often an abstract
concept that is given a tangible presence through a concrete term
(thus, the heart is independent of love but gives a corporeal
representation for it).133
With synecdoche, by contrast, the
relationship is direct, so that the hand and the sail are each physical
components of men and of ships.134 Further, these representations
suggest an essential or important feature of each: the hand performs
the work, the sail propels the ship.135 Synecdoche thus implies an
“integral relationship, a relationship of convertibility, between the
two terms,” or a “connectedness between two sides of an equation”
with each part being equal.136
While individual statements can be ironic, so that “the meaning
that a speaker implies differs sharply from the meaning that is
ostensibly expressed,” Burke takes a broader view that is more like
structural irony.137 “Irony arises when one tries, by the interaction of
terms upon one another, to produce a development which uses all the
terms.”138 Irony is a “perspective of perspectives,” a dialectic that
“aims to give us a representation by the use of mutually related or
interacting perspectives—and this resultant perspective of
perspectives will necessarily be a reduction . . . .”139 In other words,
irony subsumes the other tropes within it, and “none of the
131. Id. at 507–08.
132. ABRAMS & HARPHAM, supra note 94, at 135.
133. See Sheila Davis, Metonymy, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC AND COMPOSITION:
COMMUNICATION FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE INFORMATION AGE 444, 444 (Theresa Enos ed.,
1996).
134. See Sheila Davis, Synecdoche, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC AND COMPOSITION:
COMMUNICATION FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE INFORMATION AGE supra note 133, at 712, 712.
135. See Halper, supra note 103, at 39 n.54 (“Synecdoche . . . assumes an entity
and a part that represents it; in the part, the essential attribute of the whole is
present.”).
136. BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 508–09.
137. See ABRAMS & HARPHAM, supra note 94, at 186 (writing that, with structural
irony, “the author, instead of using an occasional verbal irony, introduces a structural
feature that serves to sustain a duplex meaning and evaluation throughout the
work”).
138. BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 512 (emphasis omitted).
139. Id. at 503.
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participating ‘sub-perspectives’ can be treated as either precisely
right or precisely wrong. They are all voices, or personalities, or
positions, integrally affecting one another.”140
This Subpart closes by recognizing an irony of law. The same
type of manipulation of tropes that creates bogus identifications and
makes the law abstract—the casuistic stretching of concepts based on
idealizations—can, in the hands of a critic, be a “creative force[]” to
help embody those ideals in the material world.141 The Article in Part
IV, infra, develops this potential for sustainable development. Before
considering correctives, however, it is necessary first to explore the
rhetorical shortcomings of the concept of sustainable development,
which the next Part takes up.
III.
A RHETORICAL CRITIQUE OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: TERMINOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION AND MATERIAL
DIVISION
This Part attempts to answer (in the context of sustainable
development) a question posed by one Burkean scholar: “what does
it mean, then, when strategic identification, at its most powerful,
appears to obscure difference and inequality?”142 Given the
interrelationship of economic development with environmental harm
and social issues like poverty, sustainable development emerged as
the name for an approach to unite disparate areas of law and policy.143
Like all terministic screens, sustainable development colors
perceptions about material reality; given the complexity of the
challenges it purports to address, however, this coloring has led to
harmful consequences. For example, law- and policy-makers often
reach agreement only “in principle,” thus touting success when in
140. Id. at 512.
141. Id. at 174; see also Meisenhelder, supra note 73, at 50 (calling idealizations
like “justice” a “creative force”); BURKE, LASA, supra note 13, at 440 (“[B]y its very
nature, language also drives toward the ‘ultimate’ of itself. And the ultimate is ‘Justice,’
a kind of completion whereby laws are so universalized that they also apply to the
lawgiver.”).
142. Kraemer, Between, supra note 69, at 160.
143. In explicating sustainable development through Burkean concepts, this
Part assumes familiarity with the broad “story” of sustainable development, which
has been re-told over the last thirty-five years through numerous books and articles.
E.g., Michael Burger et al., Rethinking Sustainability to Meet the Climate Change
Challenge, 43 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10342, 10356–57 (2013) (proposing
sustainable development through three different “stories”); Lin, supra note 1, at 63–
68 (describing the particular mythic structure of sustainable development).
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reality the achievement is illusory. Further, existing concepts have
been stretched into the mixed dead metaphors of the three pillars and
the triple bottom line, abstractions that focus on seeming solutions
while deflecting attention away from how the status quo is actually
reinforced, thereby increasing harm to the environment and to the
powerless.
A.

Uneven Development, Fragmented Laws, and a Rhetorical
Solution

Before the popularization of sustainable development, economic
development was touted as a way to alleviate poverty and other
inequities.144 For example, the global trade order established by the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) expanded through
membership by developing countries and World Trade Organization
“initiatives to improve trade with and investment in those developing
countries.”145 In addition, by “focus[ing] on the specific strengths and
issues within smaller blocs of countries,” regional trade and
investment treaties sought to improve conditions by maximizing the
comparative advantage of each member nation.146
While these treaties have increased overall standards of living,
critics counter that some aspects of the environment and some
populations became worse off. For example, the shift in the global
South to export-oriented commerce disrupted small-scale farming
and led to the pollution of indigenous people’s lands.147 Further,
144. See Berger-Walliser & Shrivastava, supra note 2, at 425 (claiming that
advocates for impoverished people and nations were “most concerned with
underdevelopment”). See generally John C. Dernbach, Creating the Law of
Environmentally Sustainable Economic Development, 28 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 614 (2011).
145. Todd, supra note 56, at 622; see Gabrielle Marceau & Clément Marquet,
Practices and Ways of Doing Things in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Law, in 15
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION: A LOOK INTO PROCEDURE 513, 513–14 (Hélène Ruiz
Fabri & Burkhard Hess eds., 2019) (Ger.). See generally General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
146. Todd, supra note 56, at 622; see Orrin G. Hatch, Continuing American
Prosperity Relies on Free Trade, 49 GEO. J. INT’L L. 553, 554 (2018) (“After all, a
foundational tenet of free trade is comparative advantage, which essentially
advances the notion that trade allows countries to focus on what they do relatively
more efficiently than others, and therefore makes all countries better off
through free trade.”).
147. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, An Environmental Justice Critique of Comparative
Advantage: Indigenous Peoples, Trade Policy, and the Mexican Neoliberal Economic
Reforms, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 723, 795–97 (2011) (writing that the WTO has led to
developing nations shifting their obligations toward the interests of industrialized
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nations of the global North exported hazardous waste to and
established manufacturing, mining, petroleum, and chemicalintensive agriculture in the global South, which resulted in significant
environment damage.148 These negative externalities were borne by
the most marginalized: the poor who live near or work in hazardous
facilities, rural inhabitants who are adjacent to agricultural or mining
operations, and indigenous peoples whose traditional lands were
used for timber and agricultural production and mineral extraction.149
Harmful environmental and social consequences are not limited to the
global South but include some communities in nations like the United
States: consider as one example how the legacy of Jim Crow laws has
resulted in de facto segregated communities with a disproportionate
amount of waste disposal and hazardous industries compared to nonminority communities.150
The law was too fragmented to offer a means to alleviate these
problems, however. While multinational corporations (MNCs)
contributed either directly or indirectly to an outsized share of
environmental and social harm,151 trade treaties privileged commerce
over environmental and humanitarian measures,152 and investment
countries).
148. E.g., Gonzalez, supra note 106, at 154.
149. See Krista Harper & S. Ravi Rajan, International Environmental Justice:
Building the Natural Assets of the World’s Poor, in RECLAIMING NATURE: ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE AND ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION 327, 332–36 (James K. Boyce et al. eds., 2007)
(listing environmental injustices within nations to include class; race, ethnicity, and
nationality; urban and rural differences; age; and gender); Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous
Peoples and Global Climate Change: Intercultural Models of Climate Equity, 25 J. ENV’T
L. & LITIG. 7, 9–10 (2010) (claiming that Latin American nations give commercial
enterprises timber and mineral rights to native land that results in destruction of that
land).
150. See Robert Benford, The Half-Life of the Environmental Justice Frame:
Innovation, Diffusion, and Stagnation, in POWER, JUSTICE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 37 (David Naguib Pellow &
Robert J. Brulle eds., 2005); Andrea Giampetro-Meyer & Nancy Kubasek, Harvey:
Environmental Justice and Law, 31 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 37, 42–43 (2020) (discussing
“historic segregation” in cities like Houston, Texas).
151. See Markus W. Gehring & Avidan Kent, International Investment
Agreements and Sustainable Development: Future Pathways, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 561, 562 (Shawkat Alam et al. eds, 2012)
(recognizing that transnational corporations promote some aspects of sustainable
development but have also been accused of “violations of a wide range of human
rights” and adverse effects on the environment); Berger-Walliser & Shrivastava, supra
note 2, at 427, 429 (“The rise in ecological degradation has paralleled an increase in
the scale and severity of ecological crises caused by private-sector actions,”
specifically “an immensely interdependent system of corporate industrial actions”).
152. E.g., Elisa Morgera, Multinational Corporations and International
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treaties reinforced the protections for investors (who had already
received favorable treatment via concession agreements).153 Further,
“underlying issues of compatibility based on goals, structure, and
implementation” among regulatory regimes have resulted in the WTO
rarely upholding environmental protection measures that impeded
trade.154 And while nations passed laws regarding environmental
protection, civil rights, and worker safety, these laws often fell
short.155 Taking a United States example, adverse environmental
impacts are not redressable as civil rights violations absent the nearimpossible showing of discriminatory intent,156 while environmental
statutes typically do not provide for money damages or are difficult
and costly to implement.157 Indeed, the siting of environmental
hazards in communities of color in the 1970s was not in violation of
the law but instead facilitated by it: environmental statutes
mandating capture resulted in that pollution going to minority
neighborhoods, where zoning and other laws allowed easier siting of
hazardous waste.158
Environmental Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
supra note 151, at 189, 189 (writing that trade and investment treaties shield United
States companies from liability for harm caused by their activities to the environment
and the people who live there).
153. See George K. Foster, Investors, States, and Stakeholders: Power
Asymmetries in International Investment and the Stabilizing Potential of Investment
Treaties, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 361 (2013); Tim R. Samples, Winning and Losing in
Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 115, 125–26 (2019).
154. Mukta Batra & Namit Bafna, Renewable Energy: The WTO’s Position on Local
Content Requirements, 39 ENERGY L.J. 401, 418 (2018).
155. See Todd, supra note 56, 618–20.
156. See Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg, Root and Branch: The Thirteenth
Amendment and Environmental Justice, 19 NEV. L.J. 509, 510–11 (2018); Jedediah
Purdy, The Long Environmental Justice Movement, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809, 829–30
(2018).
157. See Catherine Millas Kaiman, Environmental Justice and Community-Based
Reparations, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1327, 1340–49 (2016) (describing shortcomings of
CERCLA). The United States is not alone in having environmental statutes that fall
short. See Katherine M. Bailey, Note, Citizen Participation in Environmental
Enforcement in Mexico and the United States: A Comparative Study, 16 GEO. INT’L ENV’T
L. REV. 323, 324–30 (2004) (writing that “corruption, incompetence, and a tradition
of exclusion” in Mexico’s executive branch—which controls agencies like the Federal
Environmental Protection Agency (PROFEPA)—combined with a “flaccid judiciary”
resulted in non-enforcement of Mexican environmental laws following the passage of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)).
158. See DANIEL FABER, CAPITALIZING ON ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE: THE POLLUTERINDUSTRIAL COMPLEX IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 5 (2008); Luke W. Cole, Remedies for
Environmental Racism: A View from the Field, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1991, 1995 (1992)
(highlighting the irony that the disproportionate siting of hazardous facilities in
minority neighborhoods is not a failure of environmental law but instead a success
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Popularized in the 1987 publication of Our Common Future—
more commonly called the Brundtland Report—the concept of
“sustainable development” offered a higher-order term that was more
remote than economic, environmental, or social issues (and their
laws) and thus could encompass all three.159 Phrased differently,
three areas of existing law were stretched to fit within an idealization
that called for the erection of three pillars and the balancing of a triple
bottom line.160 This new term had the potential to unite diverse
interests by providing a vehicle by which stakeholders could identify
with each other.161 Sustainable development combines two opposing
concepts—the first focused on preservation, the second on
change162—an irony that forces the audience to reconcile the
disparity.163 While development is part of improving the quality of life
of the poor, the modifier “sustainable” acts as a check to ensure that
development occurs in ways that protect the environment.164 The
seeming “guarantee” of environmental protection and social and
economic development makes it “little wonder that politicians, policymakers and many academics alike have been so attracted to such an
because, “[w]hile we may decry the outcome, the laws are working as they were
designed to work”); see also David Monsma, Equal Rights, Governance, and the
Environment: Integrating Environmental Justice Principles in Corporate Social
Responsibility, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 469 (2006) (calling “many” environmental justice
concerns lawful pollution attributable to private sector actions).
159. See Berger-Walliser & Shrivastava, supra note 2, at 423 (calling the
Brundtland Report “a watershed event because it set the stage for the establishment
of the current sustainable development paradigm”); id. at 425 (“The Brundtland
Report synthesizes sustainability in terms of the ‘Three E’s’: environment, economy,
and equity.”).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 82–92.
161. Guzelian & Todd, supra note 10, at 10 (citing BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at
512; BURKE, PC, supra note 13, at 90) (claiming that the “positive effect” of the ironic
term “sustainable development” was “altering the perspectives of seemingly opposed
stakeholders so that they now agree on a common goal of development that balances
the triple bottom line without sacrificing the needs of future generations”).
162. Barbara Stark, Sustainable Development and Postmodern International
Law: Greener Globalization?, 27 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 137, 151–52 (2002)
(adopting a postmodern perspective to view sustainable development as the merger
of two meta-narratives, environmentalism and economic development, that creates
“an intentional oxymoron, a paradox” where “one term endlessly undoes the other”).
163. See supra text accompanying note 117.
164. Dernbach, supra note 144, at 617–22 (arguing that, because “sustainable”
is an adjective that modifies “development,” development must occur to improve the
quality of life and standard of living of people in poor countries, but it must occur in
a way that protects and restores the environment); see Guzelian & Todd, supra note
10, at 11 (calling the adjective “sustainable” a “check on unfettered economic
development”).
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apparently simple juxtaposition.”165
B.

Sustainable Development as a Terministic Screen: The Dubious
Identification of Agreeing “in Principle”

In sharing “common sensations, concepts, images, ideas,
attitudes,”166 these stakeholders seemed to become consubstantial
with one another—until one tries to determine what, precisely, was
the “substance” being shared. Uniting discrete concepts required
casuistic stretching as three existing areas of law became housed
within an abstraction.167 Getting agreement on an abstract goal where
everyone wins is easy; more difficult is gaining adherence on detailed,
substantive business practices, policy enactments, and legal
change.168 The terministic screen of sustainable development was a
selection that reflected one reality while simultaneously deflecting
attention from issues that would be apparent if discussed in other
terms.169 As this Subpart shows, reaching agreement “in principle”
created terminological blinders so that stakeholders failed—and
continue to fail—to see that they do not in fact agree on much
substance.
With its list of twenty-seven principles, the Rio Declaration offers
an apt starting place to address the pitfalls of “substantial”
identification via agreements “in principle.”170 The Rio Declaration
sought to build upon the Brundtland Report and the 1972 Stockholm
Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human
165. Duncan French, Sustainable Development, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 51, 51 (Malgosia Fittzmaurice, David M. Ong, &
Panos Merkourris eds., 2010); see Viñuales, supra note 4, at 3–4 (discussing the
effectiveness of sustainability as a concept “to bring all States and other stakeholders
to the negotiating table”).
166. BURKE, RM, supra note 13, at 21.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 84–93.
168. See Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change Means the Death of Sustainability,
in Rethinking Sustainability to Meet the Climate Change Challenge, 43 ENV’T L. REP.
10354, 10354 (2013) (“To talk about sustainability in the abstract is to philosophize,
not to pursue meaningful policies and laws.”); Guzelian & Todd, supra note 10, at 3
(“Enamored by this shared desire for positive outcomes, stakeholders might overlook
the lack of enforceable standards or the concept’s overly broad scope and thus fail to
see the downsides of supposed win-win-win solutions.”).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 51–63.
170. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug.
12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration] (listing twenty-seven principles that nations
should follow to achieve sustainable development).
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Environment.171 The Rio Declaration opens by embracing unity
through “the goal of establishing a new and equitable global
partnership through the creation of new levels of cooperation among
States, key sectors of societies and people.”172 Even a cursory review,
however, reveals how this unification is illusory. Some of the
principles contradict each other, such as Principle 12 calling for
transboundary environmental problems to “be based on an
international consensus,” while Principle 13 commands that “States
shall develop national law regarding liability and compensation for
the victims of pollution and other environmental damage.”173
Principle 12 is problematic for the additional reason that it reinforces
the primacy of the economic order over environmental protection and
social equity. For example, it adopts (in a near-quote) the chapeau of
GATT Article XX, which makes it difficult for nations to enact
environmental and health protection measures.174 Indeed, in an
Orwellian move, this Principle promotes development as the means
to increase environmental protection: “States should cooperate to
promote a supportive and open international economic system that
would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all
countries, to better address the problems of environmental
degradation.”175
One particularly problematic example is how the Rio Declaration
articulates the polluter pays principle. Consider how it embeds the
expression “in principle” within the verb, which diminishes the force
171. Sumudu Atapattu, From “Our Common Future” to Sustainable Development
Goals: Evolution of Sustainable Development Under International Law, 36 WIS. INT’L L.J.
215, 221–22 (2019); see U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm
Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 5, 1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Report].
172. Rio Declaration, supra note 170, annex I.
173. Compare Rio Declaration, supra note 170, Principle 12 (“Environmental
measures addressing transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far
as possible, be based on an international consensus.” (emphasis added)), with id.,
Principle 13 (“States shall develop national law regarding liability and compensation
for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage.” (emphasis added)).
174. See Batra & Bafna, supra note 154, at 406 (writing that the narrow
exceptions and chapeau of Article XX “expose environmental measures with market
impacts . . . to WTO disputes”). Compare Rio Declaration, supra note 170, Principle 12
(“Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international
trade.”), with GATT, supra note 145, art. XX (“Subject to the requirement that such
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or
a disguised restriction on international trade . . . .”).
175. Rio Declaration, supra note 170, Principle 12.
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of the entire sentence: “National authorities should endeavour to
promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of
economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the
polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard
to the public interest and without distorting international trade and
investment.”176 The agent of harm therefore bears the costs “in
principle,” so the polluter is effectively let off the hook.177 Another
limitation is that “[n]ational authorities” should give “due regard to
the public interest.”178 The “public” is a “we” word, perhaps even a
dead metaphor since “public” lacks a tangible referent.179 This
abstraction has practical consequences when plaintiffs attempt to
force polluters to pay: in common law countries like the United States,
the “legal fiction is built into the very name ‘public nuisance,’”180 while
“private nuisance merely hides the word ‘public’ in the word ‘social’
when it balances the social utility of the defendant’s operation against
the harm caused . . . .”181 The polluter pays principle thereby
reinforces social hierarchy because the “hypothetical public” suffers
none of the harms inflicted on an actual community that reaps little if
any of the benefits.182 Indeed, the polluter pays principle maintains
the status quo because, among the three pillars, commerce has a
higher place than the environment and the victims of pollution:
national authorities must internalize the costs of pollution “without
distorting international trade and investment.”183
Rather than aim for greater specificity, later pronouncements
about sustainable development like the Johannesburg Declaration on
176. Id. Principle 16 (emphasis added).
177. See Todd, supra note 56, at 625 (explaining how “the subject of the clause—
the polluter that actually causes harm—bearing the costs ‘in principle,’ . . . is another
way of saying not at all”).
178. Rio Declaration, supra note 170, Principle 16.
179. See BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 305–06, 506; see generally Jeremy Knee,
Rational Electricity Regulation: Environmental Impacts and the “Public Interest”, 113
W. VA. L. REV. 739 (2011) (exploring the vagaries of the concept of the “public interest”
in utilities regulation).
180. Todd, supra note 56, at 626–27 (citing Victor E. Schwartz et al., Why Trial
Courts Have Been Quick to Cool “Global Warming” Suits, 77 TENN. L. REV. 803, 826
(2010)).
181. Id. at 627; see Jeff Todd, A Fighting Stance in Environmental Justice
Litigation, 50 ENV’T L. 557, 568 (2020).
182. Todd, supra note 56, at 627; see Alex Geisinger, The Benefits of Development
and Environmental Injustice, 37 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 178, 205–08 (2012) (citing studies
that show that the economic benefits of environmentally harmful activities flow
primarily out of the communities where those activities occur).
183. Rio Declaration, supra note 170, Principle 16.
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Sustainable Development—which included representatives from
business and social and environmental organizations along with
governments—increased abstraction to widen the circle of
identification.184 The Johannesburg Declaration increases the twentyseven principles to thirty-seven statements that merely proclaim
various ways in which the collective “we” agree. Some of these
agreements are vague, as with No. 29: “We agree that there is a need
for private sector corporations to enforce corporate accountability,
which should take place within a transparent and stable regulatory
environment.”185 A need exists, as well as a regulatory environment in
which accountability “should take place,” yet there is not even a
suggestion about how to hold corporations accountable. Other
statements are so broad as to be meaningless, such as No. 35: “We
commit ourselves to act together, united by a common determination
to save our planet, promote human development and achieve
universal prosperity and peace.”186 Statements like this empower
stakeholders to affirm (truthfully) that an agreement exists, yet they
agree only “to commit” to united action regarding the most
aspirational of all goals: saving the planet and achieving peace.187
Rather than articulate specific points of agreement, these UNsponsored declarations “paper over” difference with euphemisms like
“in principle”; modifiers like “together,” “common,” and “universal”;
and repetition of the collective pronoun “we.”188
One might argue that the Stockholm, Rio, and Johannesburg
instruments are merely aspirational, with no greater intent than to
influence law- and policy-makers.189 The problem, however, is that
these abstractions are referenced in treaties, the opinions of
international dispute bodies, and in some national laws.190 For
184. See French, supra note 165, at 53; World Summit on Sustainable
Development, Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.199/20 (Sept. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Johannesburg Declaration] (“We
recognize that poverty eradication, changing consumption and production patterns
and protecting and managing the natural resource base for economic and social
development are the overarching objectives of and essential requirements for
sustainable development.”).
185. Johannesburg Declaration, supra note 184, art. 29.
186. Id. art. 35.
187. Guzelian & Todd, supra note 10, at 21 (writing that vague commitments
allow negotiators to claim that an agreement exists even if it lacks specifics).
188. See Ellis, supra note 8, at 66.
189. See Atapattu, supra note 171, at 229–30.
190. See, e.g., id. at 235–38 (discussing how some of the principles articulated in
the Rio Declaration are referenced in treaties and the opinions of tribunals, enacted
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example, the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation mentions the Stockholm Report and Rio Declaration as
well as “sustainable development”—but only in the preamble rather
than in substantive provisions.191 At least one component principle of
sustainable development has hardened into customary law—
environmental impact assessment, as recognized by the International
Court of Justice in the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay case192—but,
except for inter-state procedural commitments, the others have
uncertain legal status.193 Sustainable development has not been
implemented in a comprehensive and systematic way into law,194 yet
the continuing references “direct the attention” to the illusion that the
law has embraced—or at least has laid a foundation to embrace—
sustainable development in a concrete way.195
This continual emphasis ensures that discussions about law and
in practice by nations, and discussed by scholars); Lin, supra note 1, at 64–65 (giving
examples of references to sustainability in international and national laws).
191. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, preamble,
Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993) (opening that the parties are “CONVINCED of
the importance of the conservation, protection and enhancement of the environment
in their territories and the essential role of cooperation in these areas in achieving
sustainable development for the well-being of present and future generations” and
“REAFFIRMING the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment of 1972 and
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992”); see French, supra
note 165, at 57 (writing that mention of sustainable development in treaties is
primarily in preambles and early “purpose” articles). The NAAEC was replaced by
Chapter 24 of the United States Mexico Canada Agreement, which makes no mention
of any international declarations, plus the Preamble to that treaty states that the
parties resolve to “further the aims of sustainable development.” Agreement Between
the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,
arts. 0, 24, Nov. 30, 2018, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canadaagreement/agreement-between.
192. Pulp Mills on the River of Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Rejoinder of Uruguay,
2008 I.C.J. Rep. 1, ¶ 5.70 (July 29).
193. See, e.g., Atapattu, supra note 171, at 235 (writing that many “procedural
components” of sustainable development “have become binding on states”); Arnold
Kreilhuber & Angela Kariuki, Environmental Rule of Law in the Context of Sustainable
Development, 32 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 591, 597 (2020) (writing that “legal scholars
continue to debate whether the precautionary principle has any legally-binding
force”).
194. Guzelian & Todd, supra note 10, at 13. See French, supra note 165, at 53
(writing that nations have responded positively to the “rhetoric” of reports and
declarations about sustainable development but that “implementation remains an
acute problem”); Perkins, supra note 6, at 344 (“Working with sustainability is
challenging because its substance is unlike that of most areas of law practice; statutes
devoted to sustainability are few, and there is no uniform law of sustainability.”).
195. BURKE, LASA, supra note 13, at 45 (internal citations omitted).
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policy will be in these terms so that competing terms and other
approaches are not considered.196 Take as an example the African
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which was signed by fifty-four
of the fifty-five African Union members.197 The AfCFTA seems to
establish a legal framework for the implementation of sustainable
development198 since it mentions this term in its objectives and makes
specific reference to topics covered by the United Nations Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) like gender equality and food security.199
Any optimism generated by the broad agreement with sustainable
development is not warranted in light of the obstacles to
implementation: namely, numerous specific acts that must gain the
adherence of nations with different interests. To achieve “full
alignment with the seventeen SDGs and their 169 goals and 230
targets,” member nations will need to negotiate “strategies to address
food security, health . . . , and environment and climate change, along
with binding rules on gender, labor, and other aspects of human
rights.”200 This would be difficult enough with a compact regional
trade area, but the AfCFTA includes fifty-four signatory nations of
various sizes, economies, and resources.201 Further, many of these
nations are developing if not among the least developed and thus have
“weak institutions” with which to address their serious
“environmental injustice, human rights abuses and violation of labour

196. See supra text accompanying notes 58–63.
197. About AfCFTA, AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA, https://au.int/en/cfta
(last visited Mar. 21, 2022).
198. Katrin Kuhlmann & Akinyi Lisa Agutu, The African Continental Free Trade
Area: Toward A New Legal Model for Trade and Development, 51 GEO. J. INT’L L. 753,
763 (2020).
199. Guzelian & Todd, supra note 10, at 20 (citing Kuhlmann & Agutu, supra note
198, at 762).
200. Kuhlmann & Agutu, supra note 198, at 762–63.
201. See, e.g., Nsongurua J. Udombana, A Step Closer: Economic Integration and
the African Continental Free Trade Area, 31 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 86–87 (2020) (“A
continent that is moving towards economic integration must have common positions
on issues that are vital to sustainable development and prosperity. Certain matters
cannot be left to the discretion of individual Member States.”); Prinesha Naidoo, As
World Wavers on Free Trade, Africa Embraces It, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2020 (claiming
that a potential hitch in negotiations is getting Nigeria and South Africa, the
continent’s largest economies, to eliminate about 90% of its tariff categories over five
years); Landry Signe, Africa’s Big New Free Trade Agreement, Explained, WASH. POST,
Mar. 29, 2018 (listing challenges to the AfCFTA like the “heterogeneous size of African
economies, the existence of numerous bilateral trade agreements with the rest of the
world, overlapping REC memberships, divergent levels of industrial development and
varying degrees of openness”).
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rights.”202 Shining the spotlight on general provisions about
sustainability within a framework treaty casts into shadow the
material reality that fifty-four signatories with different capabilities
and objectives will have to reach agreement on dozens of goals and
hundreds of targets, thereby making it more difficult to find solutions
because there is no candid recognition of the points of
disagreement.203
C.

The Three Pillars and Triple Bottom Line as Mixed Dead
Metaphors

Terministic screens do more than mask legitimate points of
contention: the choice of one set of terms deflects attention away from
alternate terms,204 which can “deepen exclusion” while suggesting
“greater inclusiveness.”205 The dominant terms for sustainable
development are variants of a combination of economicsenvironment-society, often expressed by the metaphors of the three
pillars or the triple bottom line.206 Both are mixed dead metaphors.
They are mixed with each other, with physical pillars conveying the
same meaning—and thus being used interchangeably—with an
expression for financial statements.207 Further, the triple bottom line
is its own mash-up that forces unquantifiable environmental and
equitable concerns onto financial reporting,208 with confusion
202. Collins C. Ajibo, African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement: The
Euphoria, Pitfalls, and Prospects, 53 J. WORLD TRADE 871, 890–91 (2019); see
Udombana, supra note 201, at 56 (“Thirty-three of the 47 countries currently ranked
as LDCs are from Africa.”).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 106–13; see also Gehring & Kent, supra
note 151, at 564 (writing that “sustainable development remains challenging to
include in new [international investment agreements]”).
204. See BURKE, LASA, supra note 13, at 44–45.
205. See Kraemer, Between, supra note 69, at 160 (lamenting that “we obscure
difference even as we revel in difference” and “deepen exclusion” though seeming to
find “greater inclusiveness”).
206. Jonathan Rosenbloom, Sustainability: Defining It Provides Little Value, But
Its Meaning Is Essential, 43 ENV’T L. REP. 10344, 10345 (2013) (“Common generalized
definitions include the triple bottom line of ‘economic prosperity, environmental
quality, and social justice[.]’”).
207. See JACQUES, supra note 2, at 116 (claiming that the three P’s of people,
profits, and planet and the three E’s of ecology, economy, and equity are related to the
triple bottom line).
208. See id. at 116–17 (characterizing the triple bottom line as “a qualitative
accounting framework” that “ask[s] for decision-makers at all levels to think about
more than economic matters, but also to include often non-monetary costs and
benefits that make the world more or less livable”).
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resulting because important terms like “materiality” have different
meanings depending upon what is being analyzed.209 And the
metaphor of a pillar is no better, having become as cliché as the “leg”
of a table through expressions like “pillar of the community” and as
descriptors for mundane items like candles.210
In Burkean terms, these metaphors demonstrate how law is the
efficient codification of custom, meaning that the terms direct the
attention toward a figurative unity while simultaneously deflecting
attention away from the division between each “pillar” or inherent in
the call to balance three factors on one line.211 Deconstructing that
identification, one sees that the metaphors create nothing new but
instead provide cover for maintaining the status quo—after all, the
triple bottom line modifies a concept from business, thus subtly
reinforcing its primacy for sustainable development.212 The focus on
three pillars and a triple bottom line therefore makes it harder to see
negative consequences.213
Take as an example PPPs for food and agriculture, which promise
the strength of three co-equal pillars: to lift millions of people out of
poverty, PPPs connect developing nations with private sector firms to
promote greater efficiency, to build out infrastructure, and to enhance
technical capacities in production.214 Potential benefits for local
209. See Jebe, supra note 7, passim.
210. Some commentators have adopted the cliché “legs” when referring to the
three areas of economy, economics, and social, sometimes mixing “leg” and “line.” See,
e.g., Paulette L. Stenzel, The Pursuit of Equilibrium as the Eagle Meets the Condor:
Supporting Sustainable Development Through Fair Trade, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 557, 592
(2012) (“This Triple Bottom Line provides a starting point for developing ways to
identify and monitor actions that contribute to the three legs of sustainability:
economy, social equity, and environment.”); id. at 594 (“In short, the legs of the Triple
Bottom Line are interconnected.”).
211. See supra Part II.B.
212. See ANDREW SAVITZ, TALENT, TRANSFORMATION, AND THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE:
HOW COMPANIES CAN LEVERAGE HUMAN RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH (2013)
(characterizing “profitability” as the traditional bottom line and of the need to expand
the “traditional financial bottom line”); see also Burger et al., supra note 143, at 10356
(describing one view of sustainability as “a deceptive story that perpetuates existing
power dynamics”).
213. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 1, at 66 (“Adoption of the concept [of sustainable
development] is potentially counterproductive because it masks continuing harm and
reinforces and perpetuates existing power dynamics.”); Viñuales, supra note 4, at 7
(writing that sustainable developments “obscures” the “tradeoffs between
environmental, social and economic considerations”).
214. See Guzelian & Todd, supra note 10, at 25 (citing Susan H. Bragdon & Carly
Hayes, Reconceiving Public-Private Partnerships to Eradicate Hunger: Recognizing
Small-Scale Farmers and Agricultural Biological Diversity as the Foundation of Global
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agricultural practices include maintaining agricultural biodiversity
and promoting nutrient-rich crops.215 The language of PPPs
reinforces the union of economic development, environmental
protection, and reduced poverty, but that myth masks how the
structure of PPPs creates conflicts of interest and favors multinational
agribusiness and wealthy entrepreneurs.216 While those already in
power are entitled to benefit from these arrangements, they should
not be the exclusive beneficiaries. Yet PPPs grant multinational
agriculture companies a “free pass” to access land along with
favorable concessions from national governments, and they favor the
global South’s “large farming operations that already exist” because of
the “inherent difficulties” of dealing with dispersed small-scale
farmers (SSFs).217
As to those SSFs and the goals of biodiversity and nutrient-rich
crops, a “review of PPPs’ successes, as measured by their contribution
to achieving development goals, conserving biodiversity, protecting
SSF livelihoods, and increasing the supply of affordable and nutrientdense food, found them to be more harmful than helpful.”218 For
example, the low-cost and sometimes free grant of land to Northerntier agribusiness entities leaves less land for Southern-tier SSFs, a
problem compounded by the fact that most of them do not have
legally-registered title and so may be displaced altogether.219 Also,
many of these programs require the adoption of “biotechnologies and
industrial inputs” over local methods and farmers’ existing seed

Food Security, 49 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1271, 1297–305 (2018)).
215. See Susan H. Bragdon, Living Links Connecting the United Nations
Sustainable Development Goals: Small-Scale Farmers and Agricultural Biodiversity, 21
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 155, 158 (2019) (“In addition to being essential for the resilience
and stability of agricultural production systems and for our ability to adapt to climate
change and other stressors, agricultural biodiversity is fundamental to the
livelihoods, health and nutrition of billions.”).
216. See Guzelian & Todd, supra note 10, at 26–27; see also Bragdon & Hayes,
supra note 214, at 1303–05 (warning of the “structural conflict of interest” among
stakeholders in PPPs); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Beyond Eco-Imperialism: An
Environmental Justice Critique of Free Trade, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 1008–09 (2001)
(discussing the widely divergent views on environment and development between
stakeholders in the global North versus South).
217. Bragdon & Hayes, supra note 214, at 1297.
218. Susan H. Bragdon, Global Legal Constraints: How the International System
Fails Small-Scale Farmers and Agricultural Biodiversity, Harming Human and
Planetary Health, and What to Do About It, 36 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1, 47 (2020).
219. See Bragdon & Hayes, supra note 214, at 1298–1300; Guzelian & Todd,
supra note 10, at 26.
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systems.220 SSFs must take out loans to cover these costs, but without
guaranteed purchasers, they are often left indebted because they
must sell their export-oriented crops in a local market where they “are
not in demand.”221 Such negative consequences should motivate
stakeholders and academics to search for new approaches, yet
metaphors like the “three pillars” are so entrenched that even critics
cannot see beyond them: they continue to recommend PPPs in the
misplaced hope that actual balance will flow from the high-order—
and to date empty—promises.222
The triple bottom line metaphor is also problematic, particularly
when it comes to measuring the sustainability of investments
because, for example, there are no hard law standards for what
constitutes a green bond223 while “the substance . . . of ESG investing
[is] essentially unregulated.”224 This legal void has been filled by a

220. Bragdon & Hayes, supra note 214, at 1300–03.
221. Id. at 1300–01; see Alison Hope Alkon, Resisting Environmental Injustice
through Sustainable Agriculture: Examples from Latin America and Their Implications
for U.S. Food Politics, in ENVIRONMENTAL INEQUALITIES BEYOND BORDERS: LOCAL PERSPECTIVES
ON GLOBAL INJUSTICES 185, 190 (JoAnn Carmin & Julian Agyeman eds. 2011) (describing
how formerly landless people take on loans to participate in Green Revolution
projects, but then they drop out of these programs “because they could achieve
neither subsistence nor profit” and so end up landless again but also “mired in debt”);
Nancy Ehrenreich & Beth Lyon, The Global Politics of Food: A Critical Overview, 43 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2011) (writing that efficient farming methods have
negative consequences “on domestic economies, food quality, worker safety, and the
health of the environment).
222. E.g., Roland Bardy, Can Foreign Direct Investment Contribute to Restoring
Social Order?, 12 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 249, 267 (2016) (arguing that, for investment bank
infrastructure projects in southern Africa, “what is socially responsible and
environmentally sustainable has proved to also be financially and economically
viable”); Bragdon, supra note 218, at 48 (“If PPPs are to be effective in achieving the
SDGs and supporting the sustainable production of affordable and nutrient dense
food, the private sector part of the partnership must focus on [small-scale farmers] as
private actors, and not corporate agribusiness.”); see Fulton et al., supra note 3, at
10489 (“When the three pillars are conflated in decision-making processes, paralysis
sets in because of analytical complexity, a lack of consensus about prioritizing
between pillars, or issues that go beyond the jurisdiction or expertise of the deciding
authority.”).
223. See Stephen Kim Park, Investors as Regulators: Green Bonds and the
Governance Challenges of the Sustainable Finance Revolution, 54 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 8
(2018).
224. Dana Brakman Reiser & Anne Tucker, Buyer Beware: Variation and Opacity
in ESG and ESG Index Funds, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1921, 1925–26 (2020) (calling “the
substance of environmental, social, and governance considerations in ESG investing .
. . essentially unregulated” and claiming that “what qualifies as ESG performance is
unclear and contested”).
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“patchwork” of private standards,225 such as industry-wide ratings or
certification schemes (like the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil or
the Equator Principles),226 voluntary ratings via ESG factors
established by entities like the Global Reporting Initiative or the
various green bond indices like those sponsored by Bank of America
Merrill Lynch or Barclays and MSCI,227 and the codes of corporate
social responsibility (CSR) formulated by individual companies.228
The result is a fragmented regulatory—or, more accurately, selfregulatory—environment of thousands of private governance
mechanisms.229 Commentators have described how some of these are
rigorous because they weigh multiple factors and invite participation
from numerous stakeholders.230 Others, however, weigh fewer
factors (or only one) or restrict input from environmental and

225. Guzelian & Todd, supra note 10, at 12.
226. See Stephen Kim Park & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, A Firm-Driven Approach
to Global Governance and Sustainability, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 255, 283–84 (2015); see also
Elise Groulx Diggs, Mitt Regan, & Beatrice Parance, Business and Human Rights as a
Galaxy of Norms, 50 GEO. J. INT’L L. 309, 335–37 (2019) (describing how the Equator
Principles condition development loans on criteria like conducting environmental
and social impact assessment and including stakeholders like indigenous peoples in
the process); Melissa Schoeman, Note, The Obvious Solution to Unsustainable Palm Oil:
Why National Enforcement Remains A Necessary Mechanism Despite the Emergence of
Alternate Regulatory Schemes, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1085, 1096–97 (2015)
(discussing the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, which brings together multiple
stakeholders to establish criteria for the production of palm oil and palm oil
products); EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ASSOCIATION, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES 4–6 (2020) (describing
environmental and social factors); ROUNDTABLE FOR SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, About,
RSPO.ORG (last visited Feb. 14, 2022) (“The RSPO has developed a set of
environmental and social criteria which companies must comply with in order to
produce Certified Sustainable Palm Oil (CSPO). When they are properly applied, these
criteria can help to minimize the negative impact of palm oil cultivation on the
environment and communities in palm oil-producing regions.”).
227. See Park, supra note 223, at 27; Stenzel, supra note 210, at 592–93.
228. See Federico Fornasari, Knowledge and Power in Measuring the Sustainable
Corporation: Stock Exchanges as Regulators of ESG Factors Disclosure, 19 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 167, 177–81, 184–92 (2020).
229. See Ellis, supra note 8, at 57; see also Park & Berger-Walliser, supra note
226, at 259–60; Fornasari, supra note 228, at 199 (“[T]he CSR and [socially
responsible investing] approaches to ESG factors disclosure created a fragmented
regulatory landscape, where different frameworks were elaborated and used, and
where moral considerations were mixed with financial, business and marketing
ones”).
230. See Jacobs & Finney, supra note 3, at 95–97 (describing five performance
and indicates and explaining how the Global 100 accounts for them all); Park, supra
note 223, at 25–26 (describing how the Climate Bonds Initiative has multiple criteria
for certification and includes participation by non-investing stakeholders).
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humanitarian groups.231 Plus, there are several potential conflicts of
interest: ratings providers are paid by the companies they rate, and
some providers offer both ratings and consulting and other
services.232 With over $1 trillion in ESG assets currently under
management,233 and with investors willing to pay a “greenium” for
these assets,234 the incentive exists for rating providers to work with
companies to greenwash their image or for companies to seek out the
easiest of the various sustainability measures.235 After all, minimal
compliance can maximize the financial return through offering lower
rates for green bonds, adding sustainable holdings to a portfolio, and
attracting ESG-interested investors.236
The façade of balance hides the reality that the financial bottom
231. See Jacobs & Finney, supra note 3, at 95–97 (“Moreover, many of the most
popular and easily identifiable sustainability designations consider only one of the
five performance indicators.”).
232. See Jean Eaglesham, Wall Street’s Green Push Exposes New Conflicts of
Interest, WALL ST. J. (Jan 29, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-streetsgreen-push-exposes-new-conflicts-of-interest-11643452202?mod=hp_lista_pos3.
233. See Simon Constable, What Is Greenwashing? Here Is What Investors Need
to Know, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-isgreenwashing-here-is-what-investors-need-to-know-11604881371?page=4;
see
also Reiser & Tucker, supra note 224, at 1922–23 (“At the start of 2020, the market
offered investors roughly 300 ESG funds—a subset of the more broadly defined
sustainable funds. This number represents huge growth (considering there were
ninety ‘sustainable’ funds in 2014). Fund growth in this area outpaces growth in
traditional mutual fund and exchange traded fund (ETF) markets.”).
234. See, e.g., Park, supra note 223, at 15 (Because “demand for green bonds has
far outstripped supply,” the result is a “‘greenium’ in which green bonds sell at higher
prices (i.e., a premium) vis-à-vis comparable plain vanilla bonds.”).
235. See Guzelian & Todd, supra note 10, at 17; see also Jacobs & Finney, supra
note 3, at 99–100; Park, supra note 223, at 36–37; Fabiana Negrin Ochoa & Dieter
Holger, How to Tell if a “Sustainable” Business Is “Greenwashing”, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10,
2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-tell-if-a-sustainable-business-isgreenwashing-11602342001?mod=article_inline; Jacobs & Finney, supra note 3, at 99
(writing that “many of the definitions, rankings, and ratings of sustainability do not
require a company to take such broad and in-depth actions to receive a ‘certification’
of sustainability.”).
236. See Fornasari, supra note 228, at 175–76 (calling it “legitimate and indeed
realistic to be doubtful about the real transformative force of CSR,” in part because
“some business leaders embraced CSR and sustainability as a way of advertisement
and legitimization”); see also id. at 228 (expressing “doubts” that voluntary indicators
“can solve the technical problems underlying ESG disclosure”); Guzelian & Todd,
supra note 10, at 14 (claiming that “the desire to attain a reputation or label as
sustainable while still striving for maximum profits tempts private-sector actors to
establish metrics that short the environmental or the social (or both)”); Ellis, supra
note 8, at 66 (writing that sustainable development has been viewed “as a means to
justify economic development at the expense of environmental protection and
protection of human rights”).
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line still matters the most, which thereby facilitates business as usual
with harm to the environment and to people.237 For example, several
Japanese, European, and North American banks have sustainability
pledges that preclude loans for projects that involve deforestation, yet
they loaned over $40 billion to Asian palm oil companies that cleared
forests by burning, which not only released significant greenhouse
gasses but also displaced indigenous peoples as well as endangered
species like orangutans.238 Also, large Brazilian companies like Vale
(two deadly dam accidents), Petrobras (ties to a corruption scandal),
and JBS (accusations of packaging beef on deforested areas) have
recently enacted voluntary sustainability initiatives.239 Given the
imperative to attract ESG-conscious investment and financing, and
with few if any legal consequences for failing to adhere to voluntary
standards,240 prudence dictates skepticism that these companies will
abide.241
IV.

A RHETORICAL CORRECTIVE: ADDITIONAL TROPES
FOR NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

In light of the rhetorical challenges presented by sustainable
development and its primary metaphors, this Part considers
correctives that are based in rhetorical theory. After all, terministic
screens are not necessarily good or bad but instead a necessary part
of all language use.242 Consider how the irony implicit in the
237. See Donald K. Anton, The “Thirty-Percent Solution” and the Future of
International Environmental Law, 10 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 209, 215 (2013) (arguing
that sustainable development has been gradually “co-opted by environmentally
ambivalent or hostile agendas” into a philosophy for continued economic growth).
238. See Guzelian & Todd, supra note 10, at 17 (citing Hiroko Tabuchi, How Big
Banks Are Putting Rain Forests in Peril, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2016)).
239. See id. at 17–18 (citing Jeffrey T. Lewis & Paulo Trevisani, Brazil’s Recent
Past a Challenge to Winning ESG Credibility, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/brazils-recent-past-a-challenge-to-winning-esgcredibility-11612450800?page=1).
240. See Jacobs & Finney, supra note 3, at 100 (writing that “confusion provides
companies with an opportunity to promote their supposed sustainable practices and
products while not always meeting consumer or investor expectations.”); Park &
Berger-Walliser, supra note 226, at 288 (writing that MNCs can enjoy the benefits of
CSR without the corresponding responsibilities because of the lack of legal liability
for greenwashing).
241. See Fornasari, supra note 228, at 175–76 (calling it “legitimate and indeed
realistic to be doubtful about the real transformative force of CSR,” in part because
“some business leaders embraced CSR and sustainability as a way of advertisement
and legitimization”).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 49–57 for extensive discussion of
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expression “sustainable development” helped to change entrenched
attitudes about the separation of economic, environmental, and social
concerns and to encourage cooperation in the quest for solutions.243
Further, the three pillars and triple bottom line fail not because they
are figurative expressions but because those particular metaphors
increase abstraction. Employed critically, however, tropes can lead to
better clarity and new understanding: rather than conceal differences,
they can reveal the unexpected-yet-crucial similarities hidden in
those differences.244 This Part therefore applies the master tropes to
sustainable development.
Given the desire for greater clarity, a good place to start is with
metonymy, where the amorphous is linked to the concrete.245
Sustainable development has many recognized principles—some
aspirational, but many more seemingly linked to specific concerns like
pollution reduction and remediation—yet few of these have hardened
into law.246 In the example discussed above, the polluter-pays
principle proclaims agreement, but the actual wording obscures the
fact that polluters are not in fact held accountable and that vague
concerns about the public interest and about trade distortion receive
priority.247 A metonymic fix makes this principle more specific,248
such as by discarding the qualifier “in principle” and rephrasing the
verb to a command that polluters “shall bear” the cost of pollution.
Given that all pollution abatement measures likely increase costs or
compliance burdens, the requirement that pollution measures not
distort trade and investment should be excised as self-defeating—or
at the very least qualified in a way to promote balance, such as
mandating that measures should not “unreasonably” distort trade and
investment. Finally, the “public interest” is a “we” word that ironically
excludes those who are directly affected by pollution when they
attempt to seek monetary or equitable relief, such as through
terministic screens.
243. See supra Part III.A.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 115–18; see Rosenbloom, supra note
206, at 10345 (“Now, our focus and resources should be spent on designing creative
solutions to apply the existing general definitions [of sustainable development] to
new contexts.”).
245. See BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 506; Davis, supra note 93.
246. See French, supra note 165, at 53; Perkins, supra note 6, at 344 (“Working
with sustainability is challenging because its substance is unlike that of most areas of
law practice; statutes devoted to sustainability are few, and there is no uniform law
of sustainability.”).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 175–83.
248. See supra text accompanying note 125.
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nuisance lawsuits.249 Rather than favor some abstract, universal
“public,” the scope should be narrowed to the more concrete “local”
or “community” interest. Such metonymic thinking is not merely
theoretical but can undergird efforts at legal change, such as by
spurring litigants to pursue novel strategies by telling their own
unique stories.250
Another way to approach metonymy is as a reduction from the
complex to the simple.251 The Rio Declaration’s twenty-seven
principles were expanded by the Johannesburg Declaration to thirtyseven statements, while the seventeen UN SDGs have hundreds of
goals and targets.252 The sheer volume of topics makes it difficult to
establish priorities and thus enact legal change.253 Commentators
therefore urge a focus on a few key issues, including addressing
discrete areas of law to pursue incremental change.254 For example,
the development and human rights agendas share a goal of reducing
poverty.255 Given that many African nations are developing or among
249. See Todd, supra note 56, at 622–23; BURKE, PC, supra note 13, at 305–06
(explaining how “we” is a “wonder-word”).
250. See Todd, supra note 181, at 609–12 (applying classical stasis theory to
explain how plaintiffs pursuing public nuisance claims should frame their arguments
from the perspective of their local community and indigenous lifestyle to persuade
courts to broaden the tort).
251. BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 506 (calling metonymy a “reduction of some
higher or more complex realm of being to the terms of a lower or less complex realm
of being”).
252. See supra Part III.B.
253. Guzelian & Todd, supra note 10, at 16 (“The capaciousness of sustainable
development . . . and its goal of accommodating everything and everybody[] results in
paralysis.”); Viñuales, supra note 4, at 6 (lamenting how “it is indeed very difficult to
set priorities” given the “different array of topics and concerns,” including “trade and
the green economy, population dynamics, disaster reduction and resilience, oceans
or sustainable cities—to name just a few issues . . . .”).
254. See Ellis, supra note 8, at 72 (suggesting that “the appropriate approach to
implementing a theme as grand and overarching as sustainable development might
be an incremental one, focusing on the sites at which tensions between bodies of law
and ways of knowing are felt most acutely”); Guzelian & Todd, supra note 10, passim
(demonstrating how laws regulating the use of money lead to unsustainable results
and urging more research into targeted changes to those laws).
255. See, e.g., Elena Pribytkova, Global Obligations for Sustainable Development:
Harmonizing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and International Human
Rights Law, 41 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1031, 1034 (2020) (claiming that “the human rights
agenda and the sustainable development agenda . . . share the same fundamental goal
of global poverty eradication”); id. at 1035 (quoting G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming our
World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, para. 2 (Sept. 25, 2015))
(declaring that “eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, including
extreme poverty, is the greatest global challenge and an indispensable requirement
for sustainable development”).
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the least developed, as well as that many parts of the continent face
disease or drought,256 the AfCFTA might prioritize food production
and distribution. Such focus can transform the AfCFTA from a
framework that merely signals identification but that lacks action to a
body that can achieve incremental—though meaningful—change for
tens of millions of people.
Metonymy can also reinvigorate “moribund” metaphors,257 and
since metonymy is a “special application of synecdoche,”258 then
perhaps this trope of a “transfer” between the whole and its parts can
correct the shortcomings of the three pillars and triple bottom line
metaphors. For example, some critics dismiss environmental justice
as incompatible with sustainable development since it is not as
comprehensive: the focus on environmental harm to poor and
minority communities combined with the adversarial, protestoriented ethos of this movement means that it embodies only two of
the three pillars.259 A focus on these two parts, however, shows that
the economic element is not excluded from environmental justice but
instead reconceptualized. Rather than the top-down approach of
governmental regulation or of traditional environmental
organizations, communities sought self-empowerment through
grassroots activism.260 Rather than shun economic development, they
256. See Udombana, supra note 201, at 21 (claiming that many African countries
“are trapped by extreme poverty, illiteracy, massive debt overhang, AIDS, malaria and
droughts”).
257. ABRAMS & HARPHAM, supra note 94, at 134 (writing that many seemingly
dead metaphors “are only moribund and can be brought back to life”).
258. BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 509. While other theorists treat synecdoche
as a species of metonymy, they and Burke agree on the similarity of the two tropes.
See Halper, supra note 103, at 39 n.54; Davis, supra note 134, at 712.
259. E.g., Shannon M. Roesler, Challenging What Appears “Natural”: The
Environmental Justice Movement’s Impact on the Environmental Agenda, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND CONTRASTING IDEAS OF NATURE: A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH 230,
231 (Keith H. Hirokawa ed., 2014) (linking contemporary calls for environmental
justice to a history of opposition to both law and mainstream environmentalism); J.
B. Ruhl, The Co-Evolution of Sustainable Development and Environmental Justice:
Cooperation, Then Competition, Then Conflict, 9 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 161, 180
(1999) (“In the sustainable development framework, equity is co-equal with
environment and economy. In the environmental justice framework, equity is placed
above all else.”).
260. See LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 10–18 (2001) (describing
how communities eschewed the top-down structure of mainstream
environmentalism to engage in grassroots activism to protect the places where they
live, work, play, and go to school); Gonzalez, supra note 106, at 172 (calling
environmental discourse bottom-up when employed by grassroots environmental
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sought a greater voice in how that development should occur, such as
through community monitoring of hazardous activities and the
creation of jobs for community residents.261 Expressed as a
synecdoche, a focus on parts—environmental and equitable
concerns—can lead to a whole of “just sustainabilities” that includes
positive economic consequences.262 This approach is reflected in
scholarship that calls for community-based sustainable
development.263 From this perspective, PPPs fail because their
approach is top-down, with those in power (governments and MNCs)
establishing a framework for those not in power, with the result that
the marginalized are further disempowered.264 A synecdochic
justice movements but top-down when used in treaties and other legal instruments).
261. See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights, Environmental Justice and the EPA: The
Brief History of Administrative Complaints Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
9 J. ENV’T L. & LITIG. 309 (1994) (arguing that the main goal of environmental justice
campaigns is community empowerment); Gregg P. Macey & Lawrence E. Susskind,
The Secondary Effects of Environmental Justice Litigation: The Case of West Dallas
Coalition for Environmental Justice v. EPA, 20 VA. ENV’T L.J. 431, 466 (2001)
(describing actions of the West Dallas Coalition for Environmental Justice in
negotiating a settlement with a hazardous waste facility reduce its processing,
incorporate clean-up and disposal services, and hire workers from the
neighborhood); Alexandra McGee & Shalini Swaroop, The Power of Power:
Democratizing California’s Energy Economy to Align with Environmental Justice
Principles through Community Choice Aggregation, 46 ECOLOGY L.Q. 985, 989 (2019)
(quoting EJNET, Principles of Environmental Justice (Apr. 6, 1996),
https://www.ejnet.org/ej/principles.html) (discussing the seventeen principles of
environmental justice that were established in 1991 at the First National People of
Color Environmental Leadership Summit, including Principle 5, which states that
“[e]nvironmental justice affirms the fundamental right to political, economic, cultural
and environmental self-determination of all peoples”).
262. See JULIAN AGYEMAN, INTRODUCING JUST SUSTAINABILITIES: POLICY, PLANNING, &
PRACTICE (2013); see also Joshua C. Gellers & Trevor J. Cheatham, Sustainable
Development Goals and Environmental Justice: Realization Through Disaggregation?,
36 WIS. INT’L L.J. 276, 278 (2019) (writing that environmental justice “rest[s] at the
intersection” of the social equity and environmental protection “sectors” of
sustainable development).
263. See, e.g., Matthew N. Currie, Social Ecology and Lawyering in the
Anthropocene, 45 U. DAYTON L. REV. 401 (2020) (promoting community action to
address broad climate and environmental ills); Kermit Lind, Moving Toward
Sustainable Residential Integration with Racial Justice and Social Equity, 70 CASE W.
RSRV. L. REV. 759, 775 (2020) (“The way forward, therefore, requires a new approach,
one that values just and equitable communities and their sustainability ahead of
interests that sustain deep, destabilizing divisions.”); Shannon M. Roesler, Addressing
Environmental Injustices: A Capability Approach to Rulemaking, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 49,
51 (2011) (“Because environmental injustices often occur at the community level, it
is not surprising that much of the scholarship focuses on decisions regarding the
siting of locally undesirable land uses (‘LULUs’), such as landfills and hazardous waste
facilities.”).
264. See Bragdon & Hayes, supra note 214, at 1304–05 (writing that PPPs are

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol42/iss2/5

42

2022

A RHETORIC OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

459

approach is community-based, such as the Indian Joint Forest
Management program that is a partnership between local
communities and government agencies,265 or the laws passed in
response to advocacy by native Hawaiians to help preserve traditional
cultivation practices.266 For PPPs to be effective, perhaps they should
start with community and government planning, and from there they
can reach out to business interests (rather than the other way
around).
The final trope of irony is a consideration of multiple—even
competing—perspectives, with the result often the opposite of what
is expected.267 Irony is already part of sustainable development: the
very concept is ironic,268 and academics urge “[j]oined-up
[t]hinking.”269 An ironic approach means avoiding a knee-jerk
rejection of proposals that seem outside of the accepted parameters
of sustainable development; after all, those parameters have created
blinders that limit the ability to see existing divisions as well as
creative solutions.270 For example, given the shortcomings of private
governance standards in light of corporate motives to satisfy the
financial bottom line over the environmental or social,271 the
temptation is to reject them in favor of governmental regulation.
Defenders note, however, that many of the private standards are both
comprehensive and rigorous—even having been shaped via the
participation of non-business stakeholders like environmental and
humanitarian NGOs.272 Further, one should not overlook that
the result of multinational businesses engaging in policy discussions with
governments).
265. Harper & Rajan, supra note 149, at 342–43.
266. D. Kapua‘ala Sproat, An Indigenous People’s Right to Environmental SelfDetermination: Native Hawaiians and the Struggle Against Climate Change
Devastation, 35 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 157, 162 (2016).
267. See BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at 512.
268. Guzelian & Todd, supra note 10, at 9–10.
269. Julian Agyeman et al., Joined-up Thinking: Bringing Together Sustainability,
Environmental Justice and Equity, in JUST SUSTAINABILITIES: DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL
WORLD 1 (Robert D. Bullard et al. eds., 2012).
270. E.g., Lin, supra note 1, at 66–67, 84.
271. See supra Part III.C.
272. E.g., Park, supra note 223, at 26 (“The Climate Bonds Standards Board,
which governs the development of CBI’s standard and certification regime and must
approve all certifications, is composed of members from a broad array of investor and
stakeholder groups.”); Stenzel, supra note 210, at 592–93 (noting that the Global
Reporting Initiative considers multiple factors in assessing sustainability);
Schoeman, supra note 226, at 1097 (listing “environmental/nature conservation
NGOs” and “social/developmental NGOs” among members of the RSPO).
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governments can be part of the problem: as major bond issuers
themselves, governments face the same temptation to establish
sustainability metrics with low thresholds.273 Accordingly, as
governments take up the cause of ESG regulation,274 they should draw
from rather than exclude the standards created by businesses, banks,
and trade associations.275
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the goals of sustainable development are laudable,
discursive issues with this concept and its primary metaphors have
limited their implementation. This Burkean analysis provides a
theoretical basis to explain these shortcomings while also suggesting
correctives through creative tropological thinking. Future research
might turn to additional theories from Burke276 or other
rhetoricians,277 or it might include a deeper analysis of the topics
273. See Park, supra note 223, at 8 (noting that governmental entities are among
the issuers of green bonds).
274. See Kristin Broughton & Mark Maurer, Companies Could Face Pressure to
Disclose More ESG Data, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2020 (reporting that the Biden
administration is likely to push for rules regarding expanded ESG reporting).
275. See Park, supra note 223, at 37–38 (hypothesizing that “the imposition of
public regulation could have a negative spillover effect on private initiatives,” such as
“[i]f new laws to regulate green bonds disincentivize or crowd out other means to
support climate mitigation,” because “then public regulation may actually
detrimentally impact the environment”); id. at 44 (“As governments consider
regulating green bonds, acceptance among existing market participants may be
enhanced by involving private standard-setters in rulemaking and enforcement
processes.”); Dieter Holger & Fabiana Negrin Ochoa, Fund Managers Brace for
Europe’s Anti-Greenwashing Rules, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2021 (reporting on how the
European Union reduced its new ESG metrics from forty-seven to eighteen following
input from industry that “such a lengthy list would only shift clients’ attention away
from decision-useful information, and increase compliance costs without enhancing
investors’ ability to make sustainable investments”).
276. For example, one of Burke’s important concepts is the pentad, which has
been applied to issues of law and of development. BURKE, GM, supra note 13, at xvxxii (introducing the five pentadic terms act, agent, scene, agency, and purpose as
means of studying motives). See, e.g., Sarah J. Nelson & Luke R. Nelson, A Pentadic
Analysis of Competing Narratives in Opening Statements, 15 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 135,
passim (2018) (applying the pentad to opening statements in trial); Provenzano,
supra note 57, passim (applying the pentad to judicial opinions about summary
judgment in employment discrimination cases); Oscar Schmidt & Manuel Rivera, No
People, No Problem- Narrativity, Conflict, and Justice in Debates on Deep-Seabed
Mining, 75 GEOGRAPHICA HELVETICA 139, 141 (2020) (applying Burke’s pentad to
debates about deep seabed mining).
277. For example, a consideration of the rhetorical situation and of rhetorical
stances could complement this analysis of terministic screens and the application of
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surveyed here or those not addressed like climate change.278 Building
on the foundation of this Article, additional rhetorical analysis can lift
the veil on discursive problems and guide the way toward practical
solutions.

tropes. See, e.g., Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 5–8
(1968) (calling the rhetorical situation “a natural context of persons, events, objects,
relations, and an exigence which strongly invites utterance”); Wayne C. Booth, The
Rhetorical Stance, 14 C. COMPOSITION & COMMC’N 139, 141, 144 (1963) (urging speakers
to assume a rhetorical stance that balances arguments about the subject, the interests
of the audience, and the voice of the speaker).
278. Climate change is such a super “wicked problem[]” that some
commentators argue that sustainable approaches will be ineffective. Robin Kundis
Craig & Melinda Harm Benson, Replacing Sustainability, 46 AKRON L. REV. 841, 844
(2013) (arguing that climate change has already become such a major problem that
sustainable development is an insufficient concept to guide responses); see also
Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2009) (writing that the
issue of climate change “defies resolution because of the enormous
interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting stakeholders
implicated by any effort to develop a solution”). By applying the trope of synecdoche,
however, critics could target specific facets of law and policy that might lead to
meaningful change overall.
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